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The Director's Duty of Care Three Years
After Smith v. Van Gorkom
by
Stephen A. Radin*

Three years ago, the Delaware Supreme Court shocked the corpo-

rate world by holding in Smith v. Van Gorkom1 that a board of directors
had been grossly negligent in approving a cash-out merger proposal that
assured shareholders a 39 to 62 percent premium (depending upon the
method of calculation) 2 over market price, and that their decision was
3
not sufficiently informed to merit business judgment rule protection.
The court's three-to-two opinion was labeled a "comedy of errors" by
one of the dissenting justices, 4 and extensive commentary, much of which
"predict[ed] dire consequences, ' 5 quickly filled both general media publications 6 and legal newspapers and journals. 7 Observers attacked the de* Associate, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York, New York. B.A. 1980, Cornell University; J.D. 1983, Columbia University.
1. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
2. Id. at 869 n.9; see infra note 68.
3. Id. at 874.
4. See id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
5. Manning, Reflections andPracticalTips on Life in the BoardroomAfter Van Gorkom,
41 Bus. LAW. 1, 1 (1985).
6. See Baldo, Delaware Rocks the Boat, FORBES, Apr. 8, 1985, at 126; Leisner, Boardroom Jitters: A Landmark Court Decision Upsets CorporateDirectors, BARRON'S, Apr. 22,
1985, at 34; A Landmark Ruling that Puts BoardMembers in Peril, Bus. WK., Mar. 18, 1985,
at 56 [hereinafter A Landmark Ruling]; No More Easy Street for Company Directors,U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 4, 1985, at 95; On the Boards DirectorsFace Tougher Scrutiny,
TIME, Feb. 11, 1985, at 69.
7. See I R. BALOTTI & J. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.7, at 99-105 (1988); Borden, First Thoughts on Decision in
Delaware on Trans Union, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 3; Burgman & Cox, Corporate
Directors, CorporateRealities and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case,
11 J. CORP. L. 311 (1986); Chittur, The CorporateDirector'sStandardof Care: Past,Present,
and Future, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 505 (1985); Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the
Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985); Herzel, Davis & Coiling, "Smith"Brings Whip
Down on Directors'Backs,LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON, May 13, 1985, at 14; Herzel &
Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business ofJudging Business Judgment,41 Bus. LAW. 1187
(1986); Kirk, The Trans Union Case:Is It Business Judgment as Usual?,24 AM. Bus. L.J. 467
(1986); Manning, supra note 5; Middleton, Merger Decision Lawyers See Warning in Court's
View of Business Judgment Standard,23 Nat'l L.J., Feb. 18, 1985, at 8, col. 1; Moskin, Trans
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cision as "dumbfounding" and a "serious mistake," 8 "one of the worst

decisions in the history of corporate law," 9 and "a distinct threat to the
ability of companies to attract responsible directors." 10 Judge Richard

A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the
decision has been criticized "so forcefully and cogently" that he "hesitate[d] to conclude" that Indiana would follow Van Gorkom 11 despite

the fact that "in matters of corporation law the Indiana courts normally
take their cue from the Delaware courts, which are more experienced in
such matters."1 2 Particularly startling to many was the dramatization
that individuals serving on corporate boards could be held liable for
3
monetary damages for conduct undertaken in good faith.'
In the ensuing three years, state and federal courts 14 have grappled
Union: A Nailed Board, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405 (1985); Prickett, An Explanation of Trans
Union To "Henny-Penny" and Her Friends, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451 (1985); Quillen, Trans
Union, Business Judgment, and Neutral Principles, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465 (1985); Schwartz
& Wiles, Business Judgment Rule Clarified by Delaware's Trans Union Decision, Nat'l L.J.,
July 8, 1985, at 42, col. 3; Schwartz & Wiles, Trans Union: Neither "New" Law Nor "Bad"
Law, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 429 (1985); Veasey, FurtherReflections on Court Review of Judgments of Directors: Is the JudicialProcess Under Control?, 40 Bus. LAW. 1373 (1985); Veasey
& Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, The Trans Union Case and the
ALI Project-A Strange Porridge,63 TEX. L. REV. 1483 (1985); Note, Corporations-Directors
Who Approve Sale of Corporation Without Sufficient Deliberation Not Entitled to Protection
Afforded by Business Judgment Rule-Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), 16
SETON HALL L. REV. 242 (1986); Comment, Mining the Safe Harbor? The BusinessJudgment
Rule After Trans Union, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 545 (1985).
Even J.W. Van Gorkom, the central figure in the case, has published commentary on the
decision. See Van Gorkom, The 'Big Bang' for Director Liability: The Chairman'sReport,
DIRECTORS & BOARDS 17 (Fall 1987).
8. Herzel, Davis & Colling, supra note 7, at 14, 15.
9. Fischel, supra note 7, at 1455.
10. Borden, supra note 7, at 4, col. 4; see also 1 R. BALOTTI & J. FINKELSTEIN, supra
note 7, § 4.7, at 102 ("[t]he decision has sparked harsh criticism, even incredulity"); Manning,
supra note 5, at 1 ("[t]he corporate bar generally views the decision as atrocious").
11. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp. (CTS II), 805 F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 1986);
Comment, Statutory Limitations on Directors' Liability in Delaware: A New Look at Conflicts
of Interests and the Business Judgment Rule, 24 HARV. J. ON LEG. 526, 526, 530-31 (1987)
("Van Gorkom sent a shockwave across corporate America, . . . provoked immediate and
sharp criticism from members of the corporate bar, and was seen by some as the demise of the
business judgment rule") (footnotes omitted).
12. Id. at 708.
13. See, e.g., Borden, supra note 7, at 4; Fischel, supra note 7, at 1453-54; Herzel, Davis
& Coiling, supra note 7, at 14; Note, supra note 7, at 273; A Landmark Ruling, supra note 6, at
56.
14. The law governing the internal affairs of a corporation, including the duty of care, the
business judgment rule, and other corporate governance issues, is the law of the state of incorporation. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1649-50 (1987);
Brown v. Ferro Corp., 763 F.2d 798, 802-03 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 947 (1985);
McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 214-19 (Del. 1987); Hart v. General Motors Corp.,
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with the issue of directorial care and the implications of Smith v. Van
Gorkom in a total (as of the end of 1987) of twenty-four cases. 15 The
resulting body of case law demonstrates that the reports of the business
judgment rule's demise were, like those of Mark Twain's death, exaggerated.' 6 Six post-Van Gorkom cases have held that directors failed to exercise informed business judgment, 17 but-like Van Gorkom--each of
these cases involved egregious facts. The cases are characterized by
hasty and typically late-night or telephonic decisions that preempted the
workings of the marketplace in situations in which the courts did not
consider time to be of the essence, without the directors' studying the
terms of the transaction or asking what the courts viewed as simple
questions.
Moreover, with the exception of Van Gorkom, these findings have
arisen in the context of requests for injunctive relief, and not in settings
in which courts faced the prospect of imposing monetary damages upon
individual directors. Statutes enacted in Delaware and twenty-seven
other jurisdictions since Van Gorkom allow shareholders of individual
corporations to determine by certificate of incorporation provisions
whether they wish to eliminate or limit the possibility that directors will
be held liable for monetary damages in cases involving good faith duty of
care violations. Statutes enacted in five additional states increase the
standard of culpability required to find liability on the part of directors of
all corporations chartered in those jurisdictions.
This Article examines these post-Van Gorkom developments. Section I introduces the basic elements of the duty of care and the business
judgment rule, 18 and section II reviews the Delaware Supreme Court's
opinion in Van Gorkom.' 9 Section III analyzes the post-Van Gorkom
decisions that have upheld or struck down board conduct, focusing on
129 A.D.2d 179, 182-85, 517 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492-94 (N.Y. App. Div.), leave to appealdenied,
70 N Y.2d 608, 521 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1987).
15. The twenty-nine written opinions generated by the courts in these twenty-four cases
are catalogued on a state-by-state basis, in accordance with the law governing each case, in the
Appendix following this Article.
16. See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 554 (3d ed. 1979).
17. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273-83 (2d Cir.
1986); Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 885-86 (6th Cir. 1986); Dynamics Corp. of
Am. v. CTS Corp. (CTS I), 794 F.2d 250, 257-59 (7th Cir. 1986); Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak
Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 230-31 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987); Sealy
Mattress Co. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Sealy, Inc., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) t 93,331, at 96,682-83 (Del. Ch. July 20, 1987); EAC Indus., Inc. v. Frantz Mfg. Co.,
11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 608, 620 (Del. Ch.), aff'd on other grounds, 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985).
18. See infra notes 22-47 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 48-81 and accompanying text.
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the factors relied upon by the courts deciding these cases. 20 Finally, section IV addresses state legislative efforts to reduce the likelihood that
directors of corporations chartered in those jurisdictions will be held lia21
ble for monetary damages.
I.

22
The Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule

Corporate directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation they
serve and its shareholders. These fiduciary duties include the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires that directors
exercise the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under
similar circumstances; the duty of loyalty prohibits faithlessness and selfdealing. 23 A director who performs his duties in compliance with his
duties of care and loyalty will not be held liable for his conduct as a
24
director.
The business judgment rule is a specific application of the directorial
standard of conduct to the situation in which, after reasonable investigation, disinterested directors adopt a course of action that, in good faith,
they honestly and reasonably believe will benefit the corporation. Should
the directors be sued by shareholders because of their decision, a reviewing court-at least in theory-will not second-guess the merits of the
decision, but will examine the decision only to the extent necessary to
verify the presence of the rule's five elements: a business decision, disin25
terestedness, due care, good faith, and no abuse of discretion.
A Business Decision. The business judgment rule has no applicability absent directorial action in the form of a business judgment or decision. Directorial inaction does not fall within the rule's safe harbor
20.
21.
22.

See infra notes 82-266 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 267-355 and accompanying text.
The following discussion is derived from D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:

FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

1-17, 24-25 (1987).
23. See, e.g, Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984).
24. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 23, § 8.30(d), comment at 224.
The converse, however, is not true. A director who fails to comply with the applicable standard of conduct will not necessarily be held liable because the degree of culpability required for
the imposition of liability may be higher than the standard of conduct. See Hinsey, Business
Judgment and the American Law Institute's CorporateGovernance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 614 (1984); Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1479
(1984).
25. See D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 2; see also 1 R. BALOTTI &
J. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4.6A, at 73-74; Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited,
8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 111-12 (1979).

March 1988]
March 1988]

DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CARE

DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CARE

unless it is the result of a conscious decision not to act. 26
Disinterestedness. The duty of loyalty mandates that directors "possess a disinterested independence and

. . .

not stand in a dual relation

which prevents an unprejudicial exercise ofjudgment. ' ' 27 In the words of
the Delaware Supreme Court in Pogostin v. Rice :28
Directorial interest exists whenever divided loyalties are present, or a
director either has received, or is entitled to receive, a personal financial benefit from the challenged transaction which is not equally shared
by the stockholders. The question of independence flows from an analysis of the factual allegations pertaining to the influences upon the directors' performance of their duties generally,
and more specifically in
29
respect to the challenged transaction.

The business judgment rule will not be rendered inapplicable if one director has a personal interest in a challenged transaction; rather, a majority
30
of the corporation's directors must be engaged in self-dealing.
Due Care. The duty of care requires that directors must exercise
due care--defined as the care that an ordinarily prudent person would
exercise under similar circumstances-in making a business decision, and
the business judgment rule accordingly shields only "informed" decisions
from judicial second-guessing. 3 1 As the Second and Seventh Circuits
have stated, "directors are protected to the extent that their actions evidence their businessjudgment," but such protection "assumes that courts
must not reflexively decline to consider the content of their 'judgment'
and the extent of the information on which it is based."'3 2 In Delaware,
the standard for determining whether a business judgment is an informed
'33
one is "gross negligence."
26. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 275 (2d Cir.
1986); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem.
Corp., No. 7547, slip op. at 24 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file),
motion for reargument denied, No. 7547, slip. op. (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987) (LEXIS, States
library, Del. file); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971).
27. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
927 (1979).
28. 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
29. Id. at 624.
30. Id. at 626; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
31. See, e.g., Hanson, 781 F.2d at 274-75; Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985).
32. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 275 (emphasis in original), quoted in Edelman v. Fruehauf
Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1986).
33. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 & n.6; Rabkin
v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., No. 7547, slip op. at 18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1986) (LEXIS,
States library, Del. file); Repairman's Serv. Corp. v. National Intergroup, Inc., 10 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 902, 909 (Del. Ch. 1985); cf Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., No. 7547, slip
op. at 7-8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file) (concluding that "ordi-
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Good Faith. The business judgment rule also requires that directors
act with a good faith belief that their business judgment is in the best
interests of the corporation. Good faith involves all aspects of honesty
and integrity, and presupposes no personal financial interest or self-dealing. Directorial action must be genuinely motivated by an honest desire
to benefit the corporation's shareholders, and not by some other purpose
34
such as personal gain.
No Abuse of Discretion. Even when the above four factors are present, a board decision will be respected by the courts only absent an abuse
of discretion. 35 Accordingly, "a decision by disinterested directors following a deliberative process may still be the basis for liability if such
decision cannot be 'attributed to any rational business purpose,' or is
'egregious.' ",36 As the Third Circuit has described this rule, "where [a]
shareholder contends that the directors' judgment is so unwise or unreasonable as to fall outside the permissible bounds of the director's sound
discretion, a court should ...be able to conduct its own analysis of the
reasonableness of that business judgment. ' 37 The abuse of discretion
concept, of course, "presupposes discretion, a term which reaffirms the
broad latitude granted to the directors. ' 38 It is accordingly only the very
rare case-"a possibility-perhaps more theoretical than real" 39-in
which the business judgment rule protection is denied due to an abuse of
discretion. Such a case almost certainly must involve a waste of corporate assets, a cause of action separate and apart from a breach of fiduciary duty,4° which requires a showing that the consideration received by
the corporation was so inadequate in value that "no person of ordinary,
sound business judgment would deem it worth that which the corpora'4
tion paid." '
nary negligence is the appropriate standard of liability" in cases involving allegations that
directors have "abdicate[d] their managerial responsibilities").
34. See generally 1 R. BALOTri & J. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4.6D, at 94.1-94.2;
Arsht, supra note 25, at 127.
35. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
36. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 n.9 (Del. Ch.
1986) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) and Aronson, 473
A.2d at 814).
37. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1129 (1979); see also Arsht, supra note 25, at 122 ("a judgment that cannot be sustained on some rational basis falls outside the protection of the business judgment rule").
38. Veasey & Seitz, supra note 7, at 1487.
39. Anderson, Clayton, & Co., 519 A.2d at 111 n.9.
40. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 279 n.9 (2d Cir.
1986).
41. Stein v. Orloff, 11 DEL. J.CORP. L. 312, 319 (Del. Ch. 1985), appeal denied, No. 352
(Del. Jan. 28, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610, 40
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The business judgment rule provides a presumption that each of the
rule's five elements has been satisfied, "a presumption that in making a
business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company." 42 When a plaintiff is unable to overcome this presumption, the business judgment rule shields corporate decision-makers from judicial second-guessing:
Questions of policy of management, expediency of contracts or action,
adequacy of consideration, lawful appropriation of corporate funds to
advance corporate interests, are left solely to [corporate directors']
honest and unselfish decision, for their powers therein are without limitation and free from restraint, and the exercise of them for the common and general interests of the corporation may not be questioned,
although the results show that what they did was unwise or
inexpedient. 43
Del. Ch. 474, 482 (1962). Thus, for example, in Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d
599 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974), the court was faced with a board decision to
sell a corporate subsidiary for $280 million less than its alleged value ($480 million instead of
$760 million). Id. at 601, 607. While the plaintiff could not make a sufficient showing of
imprudence in deliberation by the board, id. at 615, the court held that "[t]here are limits on
the business judgment rule which fall short of intentional or inferred fraudulent misconduct,"
id. at 610, even where the directors' "method does not appear so bad on its face as to alter the
normal legal principles which control." Id. at 615.
42. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), quoted in Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
at 872; Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986)
and Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,552,
at 97,487 (Del. Nov. 18, 1987); see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971) ("A board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose. A court
under such circumstances will not substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business
judgment.").
43. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
926 (1979) (quoting Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 124, 100 N.E. 721, 724 (1912)); see
also Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
American Bar Association, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1603-04
(1978) ("courts have generally refrained from questioning the wisdom of board decisions");
Reading Co. v. Trailer Train Co., No. 7422, slip op. at 10-11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 1984)
(LEXIS, States library, Del. file); Wanvig v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 663-487, slip op. at
17-18 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 1985) (emphasis in original). The Wanvig court expressed this
deference as follows:
[T]he only alternative to the business judgment rule would be to set judges up as
super directors whose zeal in running this nation's businesses would be propelled to use David Reisman's phrase - by the same sort of "omnicompetent arrogance"
which has led some judges to supervise the day-to-day operations of a whole host of
endeavors outside their own areas of responsibility and expertise. In the long run,
that would be a far greater vice than an occasional bad decision made in good faith
by those whose business is business.
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Accordingly, assuming no breach of the duty of loyalty, a plaintiff
seeking to establish a breach of fiduciary duty must plead and prove facts
sufficient to overcome the presumption that the directors acted with due
care. 44 If the plaintiff is able to do so, the burden shifts to the directors to
prove that they acted with the requisite degree of care.45 In Delaware,
"director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence" and
"gross negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a
business judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed one"
46
for purposes of overcoming the business judgment rule's presumption.
Finally, of course, even if the presumption is rebutted and the directors are not able to establish that they acted with the requisite degree of
care, the plaintiff will ultimately prevail only if he can prove causation
47
and either damages or the necessity for injunctive relief.

II.

The Van Gorkom Decision

Smith v. Van Gorkom involved a simple holding-gross negligence,
therefore no business judgment rule protection-but a complex and unusual set of facts that must be stated at some length in order to understand
fully the implications of the court's holding. The following discussion is
based upon the majority's statement of the facts it relied upon; significantly, the two dissenting justices' criticism of the majority decision was
premised almost entirely upon their objections to the majority's rendition
48
of the facts.
The Van Gorkom story begins during the summer of 1980, when
Trans Union Corporation's senior management became convinced that
the corporation's stock was undervalued (the stock had traded at prices
44. See Hanson, 781 F.2d at 273; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
45. See Hanson, 781 F.2d at 275-76 (rejecting directors' claims that they reasonably relied on advice of counsel and investment bankers, and that they constituted a "working board"
that was "capable of making the swift decisions that it made").
46. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812); see also supra note
33 and accompanying text.
47. See Hanson, 781 F.2d at 283; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
48. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893-94 (McNeilly, J., dissenting):
The majority opinion reads like an advocate's closing address to a hostile jury. And I
say that not lightly. Throughout the opinion great emphasis is directed only to the
negative, with nothing more than lip service granted the positive aspects of this case.
In my opinion Chancellor Marvel (retired) should have been affirmed. The Chancellor's opinion was the product of well reasoned conclusions, based upon a sound deductive process, clearly supported by the evidence and entitled to deference in this
appeal. Because of my diametrical opposition to all evidentiary conclusions of the
majority, I respectfully dissent.
See also id. at 898 (Christie, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the record taken as a whole supports
a conclusion that the actions of the defendants are protected by the business judgment rule.").
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ranging from $24-1/4 to $39-1/2 per share over a five-year period) 49 due
to Trans Union's inability to utilize large tax write-offs. 50 Without consulting the corporation's board of directors, Trans Union's Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer, Jerome Van Gorkom, who owned 65,000
shares and was approaching mandatory retirement, 5 1 suggested to Jay
Pritzker a $55 per share cash-out merger with a company Pritzker controlled.5 2 Following several meetings over the course of a week, Pritzker
made the offer Van Gorkom had requested. Pritzker insisted, however,
that Trans Union's board act on the proposal, which was made on a
53
Thursday, by the following Sunday evening.
That Friday, Van Gorkom called a special board meeting for Saturday, September 20 without advising the directors of the purpose of the
meeting.5 4 Van Gorkom told his senior management team about the proposed transaction for the first time one hour before the meeting.
Notwithstanding a "completely negative" reaction by all but the two officers with whom Van Gorkom had earlier consulted, Van Gorkom pro55
ceeded with the board meeting as scheduled.
The board meeting began with a twenty-minute presentation by Van
Gorkom, which outlined the terms of the proposed merger. Van
Gorkom stated that the free market would judge whether $55 was a fair
price because the proposed agreement permitted Trans Union to receive
(but not actively solicit) competing offers for ninety days. He urged that
the board give Trans Union's stockholders the opportunity to accept or
reject the offer. Van Gorkom never mentioned that he, not Pritzker, was
the one who had suggested the $55 price.5 6 One of two officers whom
Van Gorkom had consulted prior to September 20 announced his approval.57 Donald Romans, the corporation's chief financial officer, had
opposed the merger at the earlier management meeting, but his recommendation was neither requested by nor given to the board. All that
Romans stated at the September 20 board meeting was that he had not
learned of the proposal until that morning, that calculations he had done
in the past "did not indicate either a fair price for the stock or a valuation
of the Company," and that in his opinion "$55 was 'in the range of a fair
49.
50.

Id. at 866 n.5.
Id. at 864-65.

51.
52.

Id. at 865-66.
Id. at 866.

53.

Id. at 867.

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 867-68.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 867, 869.
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price,' but 'at the beginning of the range.' "58 Counsel advised the board
that a fairness opinion was not required by law, and that the directors
59
might be sued if they failed to accept the offer.
After about two hours, the directors approved the transaction, and
the merger agreement was signed by Van Gorkom at a social event that
evening. Neither Van Gorkom nor any other director read the agreement prior to signing. 60 Trans Union announced its "definitive" merger
agreement on September 22, omitting any reference to the corporation's
6
limited right to receive higher offers. '
The court concluded that, notwithstanding the presumption that directorial judgments are informed judgments, the Trans Union board's
September 20 decision to sell the company for $55 per share did not constitute an exercise of informed business judgment:
The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van
Gorkom's role in forcing the "sale" of the Company and in establishing the per share purchase price; (2) were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company; and (3) given these circumstances, at a
minimum, were grossly negligent in approving the "sale" of the Company upon two hours' consideration, without
prior notice, and without
62
the exigency of a crisis or emergency.
The court acknowledged the directors' right under section 141(e) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law to rely upon reports made by
corporate officers, 6 3 but concluded that none of the statements made at
the board meeting at which the cash-out merger was approved qualified
as "reports" worthy of protection:
At a minimum for a report to enjoy the status conferred by section
141(e), it must be pertinent to the subject matter upon which a board is
called to act, and otherwise be entitled to good faith, not blind, reliance. Considering all of the surrounding circumstances-hastily calling the meeting without prior notice of its subject matter, the proposed
sale of the Company without any prior consideration of the issue or
necessity therefor, the urgent time constraints imposed by Pritzker,
and the total absence of any documentation whatsoever-the directors
were duty bound to make reasonable inquiry of Van Gorkom and Romans, and if they had done so, the inadequacy of that 64upon which they
now claim to have relied would have been apparent.
58. Id. at 868-69.
59. Id. at 868.
60. Id. at 869.
61. Id. at 869, 879, 881-82.
62. Id. at 874.
63. Id. at 874-75.
64. Id. at 875. Van Gorkom's 20-minute presentation at that meeting "lacked substance," the court added, "because Van Gorkom was basically uninformed as to the essential
provisions of the very document about which he was talking." Id.
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Indeed, the court suggested, had anyone asked Romans, for example, why he put $55 at the bottom of his fair price range, the board presumably would have learned the financial officer's view, shared by senior
management, that "the timing of the offer was wrong and the offer inadequate."' 65 The court also emphasized that no valuation study or other
justification for a $55 per share figure had ever been prepared or even
asked for,66 and that no consideration was given to the possibility of
recessing the meeting for a few hours (or requesting an extension of
Pritzker's deadline) in order to elicit more information either from management or the company's investment banker, who was already "known
67
to the Board and familiar with Trans Union's affairs."
The court rejected the directors' contention that the magnitude of
the premium over market price offered to Trans Union shareholders (39
to 62 percent, depending upon the method of calculation) 68 justified the
board's recommendation of the merger on the ground that "the adequacy
of a premium is indeterminate unless it is assessed in terms of other competent and sound valuation information that reflects the value of the particular business."'69 The court emphasized the directors' reliance on
nothing more than a comparison between the stock's market price-a
price the directors admittedly believed was depressed-and the amount
70
of the Pritzker offer.
The court also rejected the directors' contention that the post-September 20 "market test" eliminated the need for the board to perform
any other form of fairness test because, according to the directors, "the
entire financial community would know that Trans Union was for sale
upon the announcement of the Pritzker offer, and anyone desiring to
65. Id. at 877; see also id. at 867 n.6 (noting Romans' view that "the price was too low in
relation to what [Romans] could derive for the Company in a cash sale").
66. Id. at 876. The court noted that neither an outside valuation study nor a fairness
opinion by an independent investment banker is required as a matter of law, since "[o]ften
insiders familiar with the business of a going concern are in a better position than are outsiders
to gather relevant information; and under appropriate circumstances, such directors may be
fully protected in relying in good faith upon the valuation reports of their management." Id.
67. Id. at 877-78.
68. As described by the court, the methods of calculation were as follows:
[T]he merger price offered to the stockholders of Trans Union represented a premium of 62% over the average of the high and low prices at which Trans Union
stock had traded in 1980, a premium of 48% over the last closing price, and a premium of 39% over the highest price at which the stock of Trans Union had traded
any time during the prior six years.
Id. at 869 n.9.
69. Id. at 876.
70. Id.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

make a better offer was free to do so."'7' To the contrary, the court con-

cluded, Trans Union was never effectively put up for auction. The court
emphasized that the September 20 merger agreement barred Trans
Union from actively soliciting offers or furnishing information not already in the public domain to interested parties. Moreover, the court
added, the September 22 announcement referred to the corporation's
72
"definitive agreements" with Pritzker's company.
The court also rejected Trans Union's contention that the directors'
"collective experience and sophistication"-Trans Union's "five 'outside'
directors included four chief executives of major corporations and an
economist who was a former dean of a major school of business and
chancellor of a university" with "78 years of combined experience as
chief executive officers of major corporations" 73-was by itself a sufficient basis for finding informed, reasonable deliberation. 74 This claim,
the court noted, was undermined by the directors' "unfounded reliance"
75
on the premium and market test factors as a basis for their decision.
Finally, the court rejected Trans Union's reliance upon counsel's advice that failure to accept the Pritzker offer might result in litigation.
The court stated that counsel's recognition that "when faced with difficult or sensitive issues, directors often are subject to suit, irrespective of
the decisions they make" constituted neither "legal advice" nor "any
valid basis upon which to pursue an uninformed course," much less a
ground upon which directors could "be stampeded into a patently unadvised act."'76 Rather, the court emphasized, "a board acting within the
'77
ambit of the business judgment rule faces no ultimate liability."
71. Id. at 879.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 880 n.21; see also id. at 894-95 (McNeilly, J., dissenting) (including biographies
of each of the directors, and concluding that "[t]hese men knew Trans Union like the back of
their hands and were more than well-qualified to make on the spot informed business judgments concerning the affairs of Trans Union including a 100% sale of the corporation").
74. Id. at 880 & n.21.
75. Id. at 880.
76. Id. at 881.
77. Id. The court also held that the directors' post September 20 actions were not sufficient to "legally rectify and cure the Board's derelictions." Id. at 881. The court observed
that, within days of the signing of the merger agreement, dissent among Trans Union's senior
management became so widespread that Van Gorkom convinced Pritzker to agree to two
modifications-authorization for Trans Union's solicitation as well as receipt of competing
offers, and postponement of the shareholder meeting at which the merger would be considered
from early January until February 10-which would enhance and extend the "'market test"
period. The board approved these amendments before they were put in writing. Id. at 869-70.
882-83. Two days later, Pritzker delivered proposed amendments to Van Gorkom. who. as on
September 20, executed the instrument without reading it. Unlike the amendments authorized
by the board, however, the signed amendments provided that Trans Union could terminate its
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The court accordingly remanded the case for a determination of the
fair value of the Trans Union shares at the time of the board's decision,
and for an award of damages to the extent that the fair value exceeded
$55 per share. 78 The case was settled prior to such a determination for
$23.5 million, 79 amounting to approximately $1.87 per share. 80 The settlement was conditioned upon a $10 million payment by either Trans
Union's or the individual directors' insurance carrier; most of the remaining $13.5 million was contributed by the Pritzker company that had

acquired Trans Union. 81
III. Post-Van Gorkom Due Care Decisions
Delaware Supreme Court Justice Andrew G.T.Moore, who joined
the Van Gorkom majority opinion, has stated his view that the case
"doesn't stand for new law. The court was just applying old law to egregious facts." 8 2 Former Delaware Supreme Court Justice William T.
Quillen aptly reduced the essence of Van Gorkom's egregious facts to one
merger agreement with Pritzker only if Trans Union's board had actually entered into a more
favorable agreement with a third party (a better offer was no longer sufficient) by February 10.
The amendments also shortened the market test period by requiring that Trans Union file a
preliminary proxy statement by December 5 and use its best efforts to mail the statement to
shareholders by January 5. Id. at 870, 883-84. The court concluded that the directors' approval of these amendments sight unseen exhibited the same gross negligence as their September 20 conduct, id. at 884, and that the terms and limitations of the October 10 amendments
signed by Van Gorkom ensured that the market test would be "virtually meaningless." Id. at
885.
Finally, the court found that an extensive review by the board on January 26 of the entire
sequence of events, as developed by that point through pre-trial discovery, and reaffirmation of
its September 20 decision, id. at 870, 885-87, did not cure the board's earlier derelictions because the board had no legal right to withdraw its approval of the merger at that time. See id.
at 888:
[U]nder the terms of the October 10 amendment, the Board's only ground for release
from its agreement with Pritzker was its entry into a more favorable definitive agreement to sell the Company to a third party.... Clearly the Board was not "free" to
withdraw from its agreement with Pritzker on January 26 by simply relying on its
self-induced failure to have reached an informed business judgment at the time of its
original agreement.
78. Id. at 893.
79. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, No. 6342, slip op. at 3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 1985) (LEXIS,
States library, Del. file); Notice to Former Stockholders of Trans Union CorporationRegarding
Settlement and Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise and Settlement, reprinted in 4 R.
BALOTTI & J. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 7, at 805-15.
80. Perkins, Proposed Trans Union Settlement: Directors to Contribute to $23.5 Million
Settlement Fund, DIRECTORSHIP, Sept. 1, 1985, at 1.
81. Id.; Marsh, Pritzkers Foot Directors' Billfor Trans Union Settlement, CRAIN'S CHICAGO Bus., Aug. 12, 1985, at 19.
82. Victor, Rhetoric Is Hot When The Topic Is Takeovers, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 23, 1985,
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sentence: "[A] board of directors, without any significant particularized
internal or external advanced study, and without prior agenda notice,
cannot rely on the protection of the business judgment rule in approving
83
a $700 million sale of 100% of the corporation in a two hour meeting.
The decision, in short, is primarily a result of the facts before the court.
The decision's legal significance rests primarily upon its reminder "of the
need to comply with the process which should be followed when considering matters of significance to the corporate entity and its
shareholders.

'84

This view is confirmed by an examination of the due care decisions
handed down since Van Gorkom. These cases, most of which involved
contests for corporate control, demonstrate that Van Gorkom has not
changed the courts' traditional application, absent directors' egregious
conduct, of the business judgment rule's presumption that directorial
conduct is informed and taken in good faith. 85 This fact is particularly
significant in light of the courts' view (in Delaware, at least) that a
board's duty is "enhanced" in cases involving defensive measures taken
86
in corporate control contests.
This section first reviews post-Van Gorkom decisions that find due
care and uphold board conduct following full trials or motions for pre83. Quillen, supra note 7, at 468; see also Leisner, supra note 6 ("The moral: Directors
who hear the chief executive officer announce with conviction that a proposal acquisition is a
good deal simply because he says so are well-advised before they vote too quickly to think a
moment about Mr. Van Gorkom and the Trans Union directors.").
84. Block & Hoff, 'Business Judgment: Van Gorkom Revisited, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 13, 1987,
at 5, 6.
85. See supra notes 22-43 and accompanying text.
86. The Delaware Supreme Court has held that a board's duty when addressing a pending takeover bid is "enhanced" by the "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders." Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). This "enhanced" duty dictates
"judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule
may be conferred." Id. Accordingly, unlike traditional business judgment rule cases where
the burden of proof is on the party challenging the transaction, the initial burden lies with the
directors, who must show (i) that they had "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed," and (ii) that the defensive measure decided upon
was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Id. at 955. This two-pronged burden may be
satisfied, according to the court, "by showing good faith and reasonable investigation." and
"such proof is materially enhanced" where the board includes "a majority of outside independent directors." Id. Once the board satisfies its burden, the burden of proof shifts back to the
plaintiff, who has the ultimate burden of persuasion, and who must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence some breach of the directors' fiduciary duties. Id. at 958; see also
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) C 93.552, at
97,487 (Del. Nov. 18, 1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 180 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).
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liminary injunctive relief or summary judgment.8 7 It then considers
post-Van Gorkom decisions that address allegations of a lack of due care
in the context of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim (a context
in which courts must assume all factual allegations true).8 8 Finally, this
section addresses post-Van Gorkom decisions that find a lack of due care
and therefore no business judgment rule protection.8 9
A.

Cases Finding Due Care and Upholding Board Conduct

As of the end of 1987, twelve post-Van Gorkom courts had rejected
allegations that challenged board actions did not involve the exercise of
due care. 90 These decisions-seven of which followed motions for pre87. See infra notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 114-41 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 142-266 and accompanying text.
One case, Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp. (Commonwealth Nat'l II), No. 851853, slip op. (M.D. Pa. June 30, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file), fits into none of
these categories. In Commonwealth Nat'l I, the court denied a motion for summary judgment
brought by the defendants in a case alleging that the corporation's board had breached its duty
of care on the ground that "the trier of fact will determine whether plaintiffs have proven that
the Board failed to act with such care as ordinarily prudent men would have utilized under
similar circumstances." Id. at 47. The court noted the existence of several facts which, construed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, could support a finding of a lack of due care,
including "the length of the board's deliberations, apparently less than two (2) hours," the lack
of any "evidence that any Board member, other than those involved in management, was
aware of, much less familiar with," the proposed transaction prior to the board meeting at
which the transaction was approved. The court also noted the "unresolvable [issues] on this
motion" regarding the awareness by the corporation's outside directors (who constituted 15 of
the 17 members of the board) of relevant facts surrounding (1) the existence of an alternative
bidder, (2) management's desire not to maximize price, and (3) an investment advisor's beliefs
concerning the price accepted by the board and the fairness of a "lock-up" option granted as
part of the transaction. See id. at 47-67.
90. See British Printing & Communication Corp. plc v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.,
664 F. Supp. 1519, 1530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc. 663
F. Supp. 614, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp. (Commonwealth Nat'l I), 644 F. Supp. 1130, 1147-49 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Terrydale Liquidating Trust v.
Barness, 642 F. Supp. 917, 921-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985); Eisenberg v.
Chicago Milwaukee Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,544, at 97,443 n.6 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 1, 1987); Lewis v. Leaseway Transp. Corp, No. 8720, slip op. at 3 (Del. Ch. June 12,
1987) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file); Schlossberg v. First Artists Prod. Co., Ltd., No. 6670,
slip op. at 20-21 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file); Mesa Petroleum
Co. v. Unocal Corp., No. 7997, slip op. at 20-21 (Del. Ch. May 13, 1985) (LEXIS, States
library, Del. file), rev'd on other grounds, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc. (Morton Thiokol I), 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921, 928 (Del. Ch. 1985); Edelman v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 835, 841-42 (Del. Ch. 1985); see also In re Beatrice Companies Litigation, No. 8248, slip op. at 13 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 1986) (LEXIS, States
library, Del. file) (noting, in the context of approving a proposed settlement, that "history has
shown it to be a very rare case in which the judgment of disinterested directors who follow a
deliberate process in reaching a business decision will be found to have breached that duty").
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liminary injunctive relief,9' two of which followed motions for summary
judgment 92 and three of which followed trials 93-have focused upon the
presence of such factors as action by a majority of outside directors 94 or

the creation of a special committee consisting solely of outside directors, 95 consultation with financial advisers and legal counsel 96 retained
either by the board as a whole or separately by the outside directors acting as a group 9 7 (but not by management acting on its own), 98 questionBut cf Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp. (Commonwealth Nat'l II), No. 85-1853,
slip op. (M.D. Pa. June 30, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) (denying motion for
summary juddgment by defendants, discussed supra note 89); Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol,
Inc. (Morton Thiokol II), No. 7861, slip op. (Del. Ch. May 7, 1986) (LEXIS, States library,
Del. file) (denying motion to dismiss action, discussed infra notes 136-41 and accompanying
text).
91. See HarcourtBrace, 664 F. Supp. at 1521; Burlington, 663 F. Supp. at 616; Chicago
Milwaukee, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,440; Leaseway Transp., No. 8720, slip op.
at 1; Unocal, No. 7997, slip op. at 1; Morton Thiokol 1, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 923; Phillips
Petroleum, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 837.
92. See Commonwealth Nat'l, 644 F. Supp. at 1132; FirstArtists, No. 6670, slip op. at 2021.
93. See TerrydaleLiquidation Trust, 642 F. Supp. at 918; Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
490 A.2d 1059, 1063-64 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at
936.
94. See Burlington, 663 F. Supp. at 624; Household, 500 A.2d at 1348 n.2; Morton Thiokol 1. 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 928; Phillips Petroleum, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 842.
95. See Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914, 926 (Del. Ch. 1987) (granting motion to dismiss
where special committee headed by an outside director recommended transaction), appealargued, No. 133, 1987 (Del. Nov. 3, 1987); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., No. 7547,
slip op. at 16-17, 20 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1986) (granting motion to dismiss where special committee of outside directors recommended transaction).
96. HarcourtBrace, 664 F. Supp. at 1524-27, 1530; Burlington, 663 F. Supp. at 624-25;
Commonwealth Nat'l, 644 F. Supp. at 1148-49; Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 939; Grobow, 526 A.2d
at 926; Chicago Milwaukee, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,442; Rabkin, No. 7547,
slip op. at 16, 20; Unocal, No. 7797, slip op. at 20-21; Morton Thiokoll, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. at
928; Phillips Petroleum, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 845.
97. See Rabkin, No. 7547, slip op. at 16.
98. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 277 (2d Cir.
1986) (finding lack of due care in case where management was discussing a leveraged buyout
with investment advisors and counsel ultimately hired as the board's advisors before the board
first met to discuss an unsolicited tender offer, and where confusion regarding whether counsel
represented management or the board continued "[e]ven after [the firm] was formally retained
by the Board"); Plaza Sec. Co. v. Fruehauf, 643 F. Supp. 1535, 1538 (E.D. Mich.) (finding lack
of due care in case where management's investment and legal advisers were selected by management to advise special committee of outside directors), aff'd sub nom. Edelman v. Fruehauf
Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); cf HarcourtBrace, 664 F. Supp. at 1531 ("[tlhat management played an important role in providing information to the board's advisers and in working
with them . . . was proper and detracts in no way from the conclusion that the directors
exercised due care"). But cf Chicago Milwaukee, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,442
(finding due care in case where financial advisor was retained by corporation's executive
committee).
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ing of management representatives and financial and legal advisors9 9
rather than reliance on conclusory statements by these advisors,1 °0 and
meetings including only outside directors at which questions were formulated. 0 1 These courts have also focused on pre-meeting distribution of
relevant documentation, including summaries of the transaction to be
discussed and copies of agreements to be executed, 10 2 the directors' reading and careful review of such documentation, 10 3 counsel's review of documentation with the directors, 1°4 discussion of the proposed transaction
at more than one meeting, 10 5 use of the time the directors have in which
99. See HarcourtBrace, 664 F. Supp. at 1525, 1530; Commonwealth Nat'lI, 644 F. Supp.
at 1149; Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 939; see also Treadway v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d
Cir. 1980) (pre-Van Gorkom case finding due care where directors "armed" their investment
advisor with financial questions to evaluate).
100. See Hanson, 781 F.2d at 275 (finding lack of due care in case where directors "contented themselves with their financial advisor's conclusory opinion" regarding fair value);
Fruehauf,643 F. Supp. at 1538 (finding lack of due care in case where special committee of
outside directors "deferred entirely to the judgment of management and its management-selected advisers"); cf Commonwealth Natl II, No. 85-1853, slip op. at 55-57 (denying motion
for summary judgment in part due to issue of fact regarding sufficiency of questions asked by
directors to investment advisor).
101. See Harcourt Brace, 664 F. Supp. at 1527 ("non-management directors decided to
meet separately to discuss the issues raised in the previous board meetings, apparently at the
suggestion of" the chairman of the board and an investment advisor); Terrydale Liquidating
Trust, 642 F. Supp. at 923 ("independent trustees called a separate meeting pursuant to their
own initiative").
102. See Household, 500 A.2d at 1349, 1356; Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 939; see also Commonwealth Nat'l I, No. 85-1853, slip op. at 53-54 (denying motion for summary judgment due
to existence of issues of fact in case where "pertinent documents," including "175 pages of
financial analysis and legal documents" were supplied to directors at the meeting at which the
challenged transaction was approved); Fruehauf 643 F. Supp. at 1539 (finding lack of due care
in case where special committee of outside directors did not receive any written materials to
study "prior to the very day management's proposal was adopted"). But see Commonwealth
Nat'I1 644 F. Supp. at 1147 (finding due care notwithstanding plaintiff's contention that "the
directors did not receive advance notice that the ... meeting would be to discuss the [challenged transaction] and, consequently, the directors did not have an opportunity to review
beforehand the lengthy financial and legal documents presented to them at the meeting");
Chicago Milwaukee, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,442 & n.3 (finding due care
notwithstanding fact that no written materials were made available to directors prior to meeting at which decision was made); Unocal, No. 7797, slip op. at 20 (finding due care notwithstanding "some similarities to the Van Gorkom facts, most notably the lack of documentation
provided to the Unocal board before, during and between its meetings").
103. See Burlington, 663 F. Supp. at 624; Commonwealth Nat'lII,No. 85-1853, slip op. at
53-54 (discussed supra note 102). But see Commonwealth Natl I, 644 F. Supp. at 1149 (rejecting plaintiff's claim that the directors "should have adjourned to read all of the
documents").
104. See Burlington, 663 F. Supp. at 624.
105. See Treadway, 638 F.2d at 384 (directors "adjourned their deliberations for one week
to reflect on the information they had received and to obtain more"); HarcourtBrace, 664 F.
Supp. at 1530 (five meetings over six days); Terrydale Liquidating Trust, 642 F. Supp. at 919,
922 ("[s]everal meetings" and "four days of consideration"); Unocal, No. 7797, slip op. at 20
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to act,' 0 6 previous consideration of similar or related transactions, 0 7 and
discussion of the proposed transaction's likely effect upon the corporation.10 1 Also relevant are the existence, duration and other bona fides of
arms-length negotiations with third parties with whom the corporation is
entering into the transaction, 10 9 and the extent of outside director involvement in those negotiations.I 10
A court, of course, looks at all of the facts in the record before it as a
whole, and the presence or absence of one or even a majority of the factors listed above is never in and of itself dispositive. 111 Few if any of
these factors were present in Van Gorkom 112 or any of the post- Van13
Gorkom cases in which the courts have found an absence of due care.,
(board "met for more than nine hours on April 13 and two hours on April 15" prior to April
15 decision); see also Rabkin, No. 7547, slip op. at 20 (granting motion to dismiss where
merger proposal had been considered "on at least four occasions over a period of approximately six weeks"); cf.Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp. (CTS II), 805 F.2d 705, 707 (7th
Cir. 1986) (remanding finding of due care for further consideration notwithstanding "several
days of intensive deliberation" by special committee of outside directors).
106. See HarcourtBrace, 664 F. Supp. at 1530; Burlington, 663 F. Supp. at 625; Commonwealth Nat'! , 644 F. Supp. at 1149 (noting "substantial risk" that "any further delay might
result in [merger partner] walking away"); Terrydale Liquidating Trust, 642 F. Supp. at 922,
928 ("trustees faced with a partial tender offer replete with potential disadvantages... sought
out other alternatives under tremendous time pressures" and "selected the best offer available
at a time when some immediate action was mandated"); see also Hanson, 781 F.2d at 275
(finding lack of due care where directors "manifestly declined to use 'time available for obtaining information' that might be critical"); Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc. (Morton Thiokol II), No. 7861, slip op. 8 (Del. Ch. May 7, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file) (denying
motion to dismiss allegations of a lack of due care in part because the court found that there
was no "emergency" requiring an immediate decision).
107. See Commonwealth Nat'l, 644 F. Supp. at 1148; Terrydale Liquidating Trust, 642 F.
Supp. at 924; Phillips Petroleum, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 845; see also Commonwealth Nat'l II,
No. 85-1853, slip op. at 50, 53 (noting that discussions at earlier meetings made it "inappropriate to focus only" on the meeting at which the challenged transaction was approved, but denying summary judgment in part due to the issue of fact whether "[t]he dispatch with which the
Board proceeded at the meeting may have resulted from prior knowledge and familiarity.., or
from undue haste").
108. See Treadway, 638 F.2d at 384 (directors requested pro forma balance sheets for the
proposed post-merger company); HarcourtBrace, 664 F. Supp. at 1526, 1530; see also Hanson,
781 F.2d at 276 (finding lack of due care in case where investment advisor offered no opinion
as to what kind of company the corporation would be without its core business were a proposed lock-up option to be triggered).
109. See Burlington, 663 F. Supp. at 625; Commonwealth Nat'l, 644 F. Supp. at 1149;
Rabkin, No. 7547, slip op. at 17, 20; Morton Thiokol 1, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 928; Phillips
Petroleum, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 844-45.
110. See Burlington, 663 F. Supp. at 624; Rabkin, No. 7547, slip op. at 17, 20.
111. See generally IR. BALOTTI & J. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4.7, at 108 ("there are
no hornbook bright lines or litmus tests").
112. See supra notes 48-81 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 142-266 and accompanying text.
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Cases Deciding Motions to Dismiss Allegations of an Absence of Due
Care

A series of recent Delaware decisions granting motions to dismiss
allegations of an absence of due care also illustrate the courts' continued
deference following Van Gorkom to the business judgment rule's presumption that directorial conduct is the product of an informed decisionmaking process. These cases are especially significant because courts deciding such motions "must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true""f 4 and construe the complaint "in the light most
favorable to plaintiff."1 5 As the United States Supreme Court has put it,
a motion to dismiss must be denied, "unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
6
entitle him to relief.""1
Such motions have been granted in Lewis v. Honeywell Inc., 117

Grobow v. PerotI 8 and, on all but one claim, Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt
Chemical Corp.119 Honeywell involved allegations that three directors,
who were high ranking executives of Honeywell, acted in an uninformed
manner by rejecting an all-cash offer by Sperry Corporation, which represented a 37 percent premium over market price, and by informing
Sperry that they did not wish to pursue negotiations further. 20 The
complaint also alleged that these directors acted without consulting the
corporation's investment advisor and failed to disclose the offer and its
114.

2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE %12.07[2.-5], at 12-63 (2d

ed. 1987).
115.

5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 594

(1969). Only "well-pleaded facts," of course, are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion;
"legal conclusions, deductions or opinions couched as factual allegations" need not be presumed true. 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 114, § 12.07[2.-5], at 12-63 to 12-64; see
also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 1357, at 595-96 (courts "accept. . . 'material facts,'
'well pleaded facts' and 'well pleaded allegations,' "but "they do not accept 'legal conclusions,'
'unsupported conclusions,' [or] 'unwarranted inferences.' ") (footnotes omitted).
116. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Different rules apply on a motion to
dismiss under FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (or comparable state provision) for failure to make a
prelitigation demand on a corporation's directors or to plead facts demonstrating demand futility. See generally D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 218-44. The courts
have held that the demand requirement represents "a marked departure from the 'notice'
pleading philosophy of the federal rules," see, e.g., Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F.
Supp. 1106, 1112 (D. Del.), aff'dmem., 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985); Good v. Getty Oil Co.,
514 A.2d 1104, 1106-07 (Del. Ch. 1986), and that a trial court's review of demand futility
allegations is discretionary. See, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815-16 (Del. 1984).
117. [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %93,565 (Del. Ch. July 28, 1987).
118. 526 A.2d 914 (Del. Ch. 1987), appeal argued, No. 133,1987 (Del. Nov. 3, 1987).
119. No. 7547, slip op. (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file).
120. [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) at 97,535, 97,553.
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rejection to shareholders.' 2' The court acknowledged that the directors'
failure to submit the offer to an investment banker tended to support the
plaintiff's claim, but held that this fact was by itself legally insufficient to
state a claim. 122 The court reasoned as follows:

A rejection of an offer at a premium over market price and a failure to
disclose that action to shareholders may or may not be informed. The
commission or omission of those acts does not, by itself, establish the

degree of enlightenment or ignorance of the decision makers. For example, the Honeywell directors may have rejected Sperry's offer and
declined to submit it to the company's investment bankers or to dis-

close it to shareholders because, based upon their knowledge gathered
from other reliable sources, the offer, even if at a premium over market
price, was
plainly inadequate in relation to the company's intrinsic
23
value. 1

"What is missing," the court emphasized, are
nonconclusory factual allegations that would establish that the defend-

ant directors rejected (and refused to negotiate) the Sperry offer without having properly informed themselves of the critical facts relating to
the merits of that offer or that the directors, while having
such infor124
mation, chose to ignore it in making their decision.
Likewise, in Grobow v. Perot,125 the court granted a motion to dismiss an action alleging that a corporation's directors had failed to exercise informed business judgment in considering a proposed transaction.
The court relied upon the fact that the plaintiffs had alleged that a special
review committee chaired by an outside director met, considered, and
approved a proposed transaction the day before the full board was to
meet. 126 The court also relied upon the fact that the plaintiffs had not
alleged that the committee "failed to consult with and consider the views
of financial or legal advisors before recommending to the full Board that
it approve the transaction" or that the committee "failed to report its
127
analysis to the full board."'

8 similarly
The court in Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp.12
rejected an allegation that directors were uninformed. The court based
its decision on plaintiffs' pleading that their counsel had met with a special committee of outside directors prior to the committee's making its

121. Id.
122. Id. at 97,535.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 10. The court noted that the plaintiff in Honeywell did not allege that the
defendants rejected the Sperry offer for entrenchment purposes. Id. at 97,535 n.2.
125. 526 A.2d 914 (Del. Ch. 1987), appeal argued, No. 133,1987 (Del. Nov. 3, 1987).
126. Id. at 919, 926.
127. Id. at 926.
128. No. 7547, slip op. (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file).
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recommendation regarding a proposed $20 per share cash-out of minority shareholders. 29 In the court's words, "[a]ssuming, as one must for
purposes of this motion, that the Special Committee initially was unaware of the relevant facts, that information was provided by plaintiffs'
130
counsel before the Special Committee recommended the merger.'
The Rabkin court did not, however, dismiss plaintiffs' contention
that the corporation's directors had breached their duty of care by failing
to act until after the end of a one-year period during which the corporation's majority shareholder was obligated to pay $25 per share in any
cash-out merger. The majority shareholder had agreed (with the party
from whom it had purchased its position) to pay $25 per share if it
purchased all or substantially all of the corporation's remaining outstanding shares during the twelve months following its acquisition of majority status. 3 1 The majority shareholder, the plaintiffs alleged, had
determined to acquire the corporation's remaining outstanding shares
"long before" the end of the commitment period but "purposely waited"
until after that date in order to avoid paying $25 per share. 132 The directors, according to plaintiffs, never asked the majority shareholder what
33
its intentions were with respect to the acquisition of minority shares. 1
The court noted that the directors' alleged failure to act during the one
year price commitment period could not be judged pursuant to business
judgment rule criteria because the rule "may apply to a deliberative decision not to act, but it has no bearing on a claim that directors' inaction
was the result of ignorance." 134 The court concluded that although
"[w]hether the.., directors' alleged ignorance caused any injury is questionable," "[ilt may well be that, in the exercise of ordinary care, the...
directors should have known that the company's controlling shareholder
had a one year contractual commitment to the minority stock35
holders."
A motion to dismiss was also denied in Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol,
Inc. (Morton Thiokol II), 136 a case involving Morton Thiokol's sale of
one of its divisions to Dow Chemical Company in exchange for cash, 1.4
million Morton Thiokol shares Dow had accumulated on the market,
129. Id. at 16-17, 20-21.
130. Id. at 20-21.
131. Id. at 2, 10, 16-17.
132. Id. at 3.
133. Id. at 25.
134. Id. at 24; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 25; see also Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., No. 7547, slip op. at 8-10
(Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file) (denying motion for reargument).
136. No. 7861, slip op. (Del. Ch. May 7, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file).
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and a promise by Dow not to purchase any Morton Thiokol stock for ten
years. 137 The plaintiffs alleged that (1) only two of Morton Thiokol's
twelve directors had "any real notice" of the proposed transaction prior
to the board meeting at which it was discussed, (2) the remaining ten
directors "had only two short oral presentations to guide them," (3) "no
one on the Board questioned, nor were they apprised of," an investment
banker's valuation of the assets being sold, (4) "the directors ignored obvious opportunities to obtain a higher price," and (5) there was no
"emergency" requiring an immediate decision. 138 The court held that
these allegations, "if true, preclude the protection from judicial scrutiny
139
afforded by the business judgment rule."'
Interestingly, the same court, in Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc.
(Morton Thiokol J),140 had denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction. The court's preliminary injunction opinion relied upon the
fact that ten of twelve members of the board were outside directors who
acted with the advice of investment bankers and counsel, and emphasized that "[t]here is no evidence that the negotiations were carried out
other than at arms-length and they were apparently carefully
considered."14'
The lesson of Morton Thiokol I and Morton Thiokol II, when taken
together, is that a plaintiff may survive a motion to dismiss by pleading
facts which, if true, would constitute conduct sufficiently egregious to
overcome the business judgment rule's presumption of propriety. That
plaintiff, however, may have an extremely difficult time obtaining evidence that would prove his allegations once the corporation's directors
are given an opportunity to explain what they really did and why.
C.

Cases Finding an Absence of Due Care and Enjoining Board Conduct

Since Van Gorkom was decided, a lack of due care and thus an absence of business judgment rule protection for directorial conduct has
been found in two Delaware Chancery Court cases-EAC Industries,
Inc. v. Frantz Manufacturing Co.,' 42 and Sealy Mattress Co. of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Sealy, Inc. 143-and four federal court cases-Hanson Trust
PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 44 Edelman v. FruehaufCorp.,'45 Dy137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921 (Del. Ch. 1985).
Id. at 928.
11 DEL. J.CORP. L. 608 (Del. Ch.), aff'don othergrounds, 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985).
[1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,331 (Del. Ch. July 20, 1987).
781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
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namics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. (CTS I), 146 and Buckhorn, Inc. v.
Ropak Corp. 147 These cases do not reflect new law or a judicial re-examination of the courts' traditional application, absent directors' egregious
conduct, of the business judgment rule's presumption that directorial action rests upon an informed decision-making process.
Indeed, even when the factual scenarios underlying these decisions
did "not rise to that level of gross negligence found in Smith v. Van
Gorkom,"1 48 the conduct still lacked most if not all of the considerations
that have been relied upon by post-Van Gorkom courts upholding directorial conduct. 149 Five of the six decisions-Frantz,Sealy, Hanson, Fruehauf, and Buckhorn-involved board action taken at meetings described
as short,150 late-night' 5 ' and/or telephonic;1 52 the sixth case (CTS I) involved a longer meeting but still no "cool, dispassionate and thorough"

deliberation. 153
One of the Delaware cases, Frantz, involved patently inequitable
and entrenchment-motivated conduct following an insurgent's acquisition of 51 percent of the corporation's stock.' 54 The other Delaware
case, Sealy, involved a concededly uninformed decision by a subsidiary
corporation's board to approve a merger proposed by its parent. '55 This
decision was so one sided that the court observed that "if one were setting out to write a textbook study on how one might violate as many
fiduciary precepts as possible in the course of a single merger transaction,
this case would be a good model."' 15 6
The four federal court decisions-Hanson, Fruehauf, CTS I, and
Buckhorn-each involved conduct that preempted the marketplace by
145. 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986).
146. 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
147. 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987).
148. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 275.
149. See supra notes 90-113, 118-30 and accompanying text.
150. See Buckhorn, 656 F. Supp. at 230 ("approximately thirty minutes"); Plaza Secs. Co.
v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535, 1539 (E.D. Mich.) (special committee recommended
transaction "immediately after being advised of the highlights of the transaction on the evening of June 24th" and "[a] meeting of the full board then commenced" and "following twenty
minutes of discussion" the transaction was approved), aff'd sub nom. Edelman v. Fruehauf
Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Sealy, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
96,678 ("[the 15 to 30 minute meeting had six important agenda items of which the merger
was but one"); Frantz, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 620 (referring to "absence of discussion").
151. See Hanson, 781 F.2d at 275.
152. See Buckhorn, 656 F. Supp. at 230; Sealy, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 96,677.
153. CTSI, 794 F.2d at 257.
154. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 176-86 and accompanying text.
156. Sealy, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,681.
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either cutting off an on going and competitive bidding process in favor of
a preferred bidder aligned with management (Hanson and Fruehauf) or
putting into place a poison pill designed to end an unwanted acquiror's
bid to take over the company (CTS I and Buckhorn), and which in one
case (CTS I) was, according to the court, not even "a plausible measure
for maximizing shareholder wealth."' 57 Each of these four cases involved setting a price for the sale of the corporation or adoption of a
poison pill by management or management's representatives, rather than
by outside directors or investment advisors working for the board as a
whole or for the outside directors.15 8 Each of these four cases also involved highly suspect investment advisor presentations, which either
omitted information, such as the range of fair value, or which relied exclusively on highly suspect management-prepared forecasts-serious deficiencies that could easily have been detected had the corporation's
outside directors asked what these four courts viewed as simple and obvi159
ously relevant questions.
An additional thread linking the Frantz, Sealy, Hanson, Fruehauf,
CTS I, and Buckhorn decisions is the injunctive relief setting in which
they arose.'60 None of these six courts was faced with the prospect of
imposing monetary damages upon individual directors-a factor likely to
deter many judges and juries who might otherwise be inclined to find an
absence of business judgment rule protection.' 6' Commentators have
suggested that "the business judgment rule may provide greater protection to the decision-maker than to the decision itself,"' 62 and that a
court's view of directorial conduct "may ultimately depend on whether
the case arises as a damage suit against the directors ... or whether the
case arises ... in an injunction setting."' 163 To date, however, the only
case law support for this proposition is Gimbel v. Signal Companies,
157. CTSI, 794 F.2d at 258.
158. See supra notes 97-98, infra notes 199-200, 208-19, 224-32, 246-66 and accompanying
text.
159. See supra notes 99-100, infra notes 194-98, 210-15, 225-27, 251-55, 264-66 and accompanying text.
160. See Hanson, 781 F.2d at 267; Fruehauf 798 F.2d at 884; CTS 1 794 F.2d at 251-52;
Buckhorn, 656 F. Supp. at 212; Sealy, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
96,675; Frantz, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 610.
161. See Comment, Limiting Corporate Directors'Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7)
and the Erosion of the Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 252 (1987) ("One key to the
Hanson Trust ruling is the procedural posture of the case: the plaintiffs were appealing the
denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction.... The Hanson Trust court was not faced
with the dilemma of imposing ruinous personal damages upon the defendant directors for their
breach of the duty of care.").
162. 1 R. BALOTTI & J. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4.6, at 75.
163. Id. § 4.7, at 107-08; see also Veasey & Seitz, supra note 7, at 1487.
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Inc., 1 64 a decision in which the court issued a preliminary injunction

notwithstanding a finding that the plaintiff had failed to "raise at this
stage a reasonable probability that [he] will be able to pierce the 'business
165
judgment' standard."
The Frantz and Sealy lack of due care holdings involved relatively
easy-to-explain sets of facts; 16 6 by contrast, and like Van Gorkom, the
Hanson, Fruehauf,CTS I, and Buckhorn cases involved relatively complex factual settings that must be stated at some length in order to under167
stand fully these courts' holdings.
(1) Frantz and Sealy

a. EAC Industries,Inc. v. FrantzManufacturingCo.168 involved an
unauthorized funding of an Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) by the
President and Chief Executive Officer of Frantz Manufacturing. The
funding occurred the day after EAC Industries had (1) announced its
purchase of 51 percent of Frantz's outstanding stock and (2) presented
consents replacing one member of the board and amending the corporation's by-laws to require both a quorum of all directors and a unanimous
vote of all directors in order for the board to take any action.169 The
effect of the ESOP funding was to reduce EAC's equity interest in Frantz
170
from 51 to 44 percent.
The court rejected, on three separate grounds, Frantz's contention
that the ESOP funding was ratified by the board at a meeting held six
days later. First, the court held that EAC's consents and adoption of the
by-law were valid, thus rendering any board action not approved by all
directors-including EAC's nominee-null and void. 171 Second, the
court held that "[t]he hastily-called directors meeting . . . conducted
from a script prepared by counsel, had an aura of inevitability which was
clearly at variance with the requirement that the board members be adequately informed and act after sufficient deliberation."' 172 Third, the
court held that "[w]hatever may have been the ESOP's original purpose
at the time formulated, its funding ...was primarily for the purpose of
164. 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
165. Id. at 615.
166. See infra notes 168-86 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 187-266 and accompanying text.
168.

11

DEL. J. CORP. L. 608 (Del. Ch.), aff'd on othergrounds, 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985).

169. Id. at 613-14,
170. Id. at 618.
171. Id. at 616-18, 620.
172. Id. at 620.
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diluting EAC's majority control."' 173 Corporate action seeking to defeat
a takeover effort after control has already been acquired, the court emphasized, constitutes inequitable conduct and is not protected by the
74
business judgment rule.1
Frantz thus involved a finding of a lack of due care under circumstances so egregious that the court was able to base its decision on the
separate and independent grounds of a governing by-law and obvious entrenchment motives. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's decision on these grounds alone, without addressing the
board's failure to satisfy the business judgment rule's informed decision
75
requirement. 1
b. Sealy Mattress Co. of New Jersey v. Sealy, Inc. 176 involved a decision by Sealy's directors, each of whom "were employees of and beholden to" 177 either Sealy's parent company, Ohio-Sealy, or Ohio-Sealy's
parent, Ohio Mattress, 178 to approve a merger of Sealy into Ohio
Sealy.17 9 The merger was approved during a fifteen to thirty minute telephone board meeting at which five other important agenda items were
discussed. 180 The court found that the merger price was presented by
Ohio-Sealy as a fait accompli, with no deliberation as to its basis, ade82
quacy or fairness.181 No investment banker or attorney was consulted.
Furthermore, the value of $27 million and $45 million antitrust verdicts
that Ohio-Sealy (and a company later acquired by Ohio-Sealy) had obtained against Sealy-all prior to Ohio-Sealy's acquisition of majority
shareholder status of Sealy' 83-was never addressed, notwithstanding its
status as a "critical factor in any assessment of the fairness of the merger
price."' 18 4 The court noted unrebutted evidence that these verdicts were
worth considerably less than their face amounts and that Ohio-Sealy, after becoming Sealy's controlling shareholder, had instructed Sealy's
counsel to end Sealy's challenge of the verdicts.185 Given this scenario, it
is not surprising that Sealy's directors did not dispute that they had ap173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 621.
Id. at 620-21.
See Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 406-09 (Del. 1985).
[1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,331 (Del. Ch. July 20, 1987).
Id. at 96,683.
Id. at 96,674.
Id. at 96,683.
Id. at 96,678.
Id. at 96,677.
Id. at 96,683.
See id. at 96,675.
Id. at 96,677.
Id. at 96,676 n.8, 96,676-78.
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proved the merger in a "completely uninformed" manner; indeed, in

their own counsel's words, Sealy's directors "[functioned] in a ministerial
capacity to carry out the parent [corporation's] bidding.'

86

(2) Hanson, Fruehauf, CTS I, CTS II, and Buckhorn
a. In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 187 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court decision' 8 8 and
enjoined the exercise of an asset lock-up option 8 9 granted by SCM Corporation to one of two competing bidders for SCM. Hanson had opened
the bidding with a $60 per share all-cash tender offer, which was followed by a leveraged buy-out offer by SCM's management and Merrill
Lynch at $70 per share, with 85 percent of the consideration to be in cash
and 15 percent in debt securities. Hanson responded with a $72 all-cash
bid, and the SCM management-Merrill group raised its bid to $74 per
share, this time 80 percent cash and 20 percent debt securities. 190 Without giving Hanson an opportunity to top this bid, 19 1 SCM's board
granted Merrill an option to buy two of SCM's most attractive businesses
for $350 million and $80 million, respectively, in the event any party

other than Merrill (i.e., Hanson) should acquire more than one-third of
SCM's outstanding shares. 192 The district court found that the SCM directors "knew or should have known" that this lock-up option would
cause the bidding for control of SCM to "come to an end."' 193
The Second Circuit concluded that the SCM directors' conduct con186. Id. at 96,683. The court rejected the directors' defense that as employees of OhioSealy and Ohio Mattress they were entitled (and obliged) to demonstrate their loyalty to their
employer. To the contrary, the court emphasized, having assumed directorships of Sealy,
these individuals became fiduciaries for all of Sealy's shareholders, including its minority
shareholders. Id.
187. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
188. Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 623 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 781 F.2d
264 (2d Cir. 1986).
189. An asset lock-up option involves "making some [corporate] asset available to the
potential buyer at a price less than those assets would bring in an orderly sale, thereby tending
to foreclose further bidding for the target company." Hanson, 781 F.2d at 284 (Oakes, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 276 ("the very purpose of an asset option in a takeover context is to
give the optionee a bargain as an incentive to bid and an assured benefit should its bid fail").
Asset lock-up options differ significantly from asset sales in which a prize asset sought by a
hostile bidder is placed out of its reach at a price which is fair to the corporation, and which
does not foreclose bidding. See, e.g., GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 6155, slip op.
at 3-5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 1980).
190. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 267, 269-70.
191. Id. at 271.
192. Id. at 266-67, 270.
193. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. at 855.
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stituted a breach of their duty of care. The court summarized the critical
board meeting as follows:
[T]he SCM directors, in a three-hour late-night meeting, apparently
contented themselves with their financial advisor's conclusory opinion
that the option prices were "within the range of fair value," although
had the directors inquired, they would have learned that Goldman
Sachs [their investment banker] had not calculated a range of fairness.
There was not even a written opinion from Goldman Sachs as to the
value of the two optioned businesses ....
Moreover, the Board never
asked what the top value was or why two businesses that generated
half of SCM's income were being sold for one third of the total
purchase price of the company ... or what the company would look
like if the options were exercised .... There was little or no discussion
of how likely it was that the option "trigger" would be pulled, or194
who
would make that decision-Merrill, the Board, or management.
The court emphasized that since Hanson could not acquire stock
through its then outstanding tender offer for a full week after the SCM
board meeting at which the option was granted, there was certainly no
"emergency need for a hasty decision."' 195 The court rejected the directors' argument that they had properly relied upon legal and investment
banking advice, stating that "directors have some oversight obligations to
become reasonably familiar with an opinion, report, or other source of
advice before becoming entitled to rely on it": 196
[t]he Board failed to read or review carefully the various offers and
agreements and instead relied on the advisers' descriptions ....
[T]he
directors accepted Goldman Sachs' conclusion that the prices of the
optioned assets were fair, without ever inquiring about the range of fair
value ....
The directors did not seek any documents in support of
Goldman Sachs' conclusory opinion. . . . Moreover, the fact that
[Goldman Sachs] opined . . . that an "orderly sale" could achieve
higher prices . . . should have led the directors to investigate, rather
than rely baldly upon, the oral opinion as to fairness. Finally,
Goldman Sachs offered no opinion as to what kind of company SCM
would be without its "core" businesses. On this issue, of which there is
no evidence of any inquiry by the directors, there is thus not even a
conclusory opinion197from its advisors on which the directors plausibly
might have relied.
"Indeed," the court pointed out, "given that the very purpose of an asset
option in a takeover context is to give the optionee a bargain as an incentive to bid and an assured benefit should its bid fail,.. . a heightened duty
of care" may in fact have been appropriate. 98 Moreover, the court
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Hanson, 781 F.2d at 275.
Id. at 275; see also id. at 276.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.
Id. (emphasis in original). The court also rejected SCM's defense that its "working
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noted, the fact that the transaction had been "proposed by management
directors with a not insubstantial potential 15% equity interest in the
arrangement" should have prompted the independent directors on
SCM's board to take "at least some... prophylactic steps."1 99 Instead,
according to the court, SCM's board delegated broad authority to management, which then "presented ...various agreements to the SCM directors more or less as faits accompli, which the Board quite hastily
approved." 2°I
b. In Edelman v. FruehaufCorp.,20 1 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court breach of fiduciary duty finding.20 2 Like
Hanson, Fruehaufinvolved a bidding contest between an unwanted acquiror and a leveraged buy-out group affiliated with management. Asher
B. Edelman began the bidding with an all-cash offer of $41 per share,
which was later increased to $42 per share. Fruehauf's board rejected
this proposal, and Edelman responded by announcing his intention to
20 3
make a $44 all-cash tender offer for all Fruehauf shares.
A Fruehauf management-Merrill Lynch leveraged buyout group
then offered to purchase 77 percent of Fruehauf's stock for $48.50 in
cash and to issue securities valued at $48.50 per share to Fruehauf's remaining shareholders. 2°4 A special committee composed of outside directors approved the proposed transaction without affording Edelman an
opportunity to top the bid.205 Edelman then offered either to structure a
similar merger at a price of $49.50 per share or to make a tender offer for
all outstanding Fruehauf shares at $49.50 per share in cash. 20 6 The committee rejected both of these offers during a telephone meeting on the
board" was "already familiar" with the corporation and was thus capable of making such swift
decisions: "Given this 'working board's' considerable familiarity with SCM," the court noted,

"we must question why it did not find the option prices troublesome in light of the considera-

ble evidence . . . that the optioned assets were worth considerably more than their option
prices." Id.
199. Id. at 277.
200. Id. The court observed that "broad delegations of authority are not uncommon and
generally are quite proper as conforming to the way that a Board acts in generating proposals
for its own consideration. However, when management has a self-interest in consummating an
LBO,standardpost hoc review procedures may be insufficient." Id. The court added that an
"independent negotiating committee of outside directors ...certainly would have constituted
one appropriate procedure .. " Id.
201. 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986).
202. Plaza Secs. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd sub nom.
Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986).
203. Fruehauf 798 F.2d at 884.
204. Id. at 884-85.
205. Id. at 885.
206. Fruehauf 643 F. Supp. at 1540.
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ground that Edelman had not "evidence[d] firm financial commitments
for the entire transaction"-a requirement not imposed upon the man20 7
agement-Merrill Lynch group.
Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Fruehauf directors' conduct constituted a breach of their
fiduciary duties. The district court harshly criticized the special committee's deference to the judgment of management and management-selected
advisors. The court observed that the committee had over the course of
five days evaluated the management buyout proposal in four "meetings,"
three of which were simply telephone updates during which the committee was advised of the status of negotiations.20 8 The fourth meeting was
held when the committee and the entire board were flown to New York
to approve all the necessary documentation for the transaction.20 9 The
court noted that the committee was unaware either that Merrill Lynch
had apparently been willing to pay $50 per share or that Kidder
Peabody, the committee's investment advisor, had determined that the
value of the corporation's stock might exceed that $50 figure. 210 At no
time, the court added, did the committee make any attempt to negotiate
the terms of the transaction directly with Merrill Lynch or even to give
Kidder Peabody "specific instructions" regarding the negotiations that
2 11
did take place.
The court emphasized that the committee did not receive any written documentation regarding the proposed transaction until it was
presented with final drafts at the committee's final meeting, and that
these final drafts were explained to, but not read by, the committee members.2 12 The court concluded that the committee's "passivity and the superficiality of its review" were "clearly demonstrated" 2 3 by the
committee's failure:
A. to negotiate, observe negotiations or to suggest that management
seek an all-cash transaction, or to consider the possible benefits of any
transaction other than the one proposed by management despite the
obvious inequities to shareholders of this transaction, particularly to
those who would be left as shareholders in a new corporation
subordinate to management shareholders;
B. to either ask for or determine a range of value for the company;
C. to determine how management was going to obtain... $100 mil207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1540-41.
at 1540.

at 1538.
at 1539.
at 1538.
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lion in corporate funds it had committed to purchase the company's
shares ... ;

D. to request any written evaluation or analysis prior to making its
recommendation of either the management proposal, or of comparative values of the Edelman Group and management proposals to the
shareholders;
214
E. to attempt to negotiate out the "no-shop" provision;
F. to determine the value of the company before or after the merger,
or the value of management's share of that company, as opposed to the
shares of those shareholders excluded from the management cash

tender offer .... 215
In short, the court stated, "the Committee's review was done in a
'21 6
hurried, last minute atmosphere to meet the needs of management.
The Fruehauf directors-including those on the committee and those not
on the committee-had "willy-nilly" approved the management buyout,
erected barriers to alternative offers, and refused to negotiate two offers
from the Edleman group that may have been superior to management's
offer. 21 7 All this, the court thus concluded, constituted a breach of the
Fruehauf directors' duties of care and loyalty and a failure to exercise
business judgment. 2 18 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that the
evidence "compel[led] the conclusion that the directors simply 'rubber
'21 9
stamped' the management buyout proposal.
c. In Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica v. CTS Corp. (CTS I),220 the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court order 221 enjoining a poison pill
adopted by CTS Corporation in response to a hostile tender offer by Dynamics Corporation for 18 percent of CTS's shares (Dynamics already
held 9.6 percent), to be followed by a proxy contest for control of the
corporation. 222 The pill provided that shareholders would receive one
right per share and that, following the acquisition of 15 percent or more
of CTS's stock by any person or group, all CTS shareholders other than
the acquiror would be entitled to purchase a CTS stock and debenture
2 23
package for 25 percent of its market value.
The court, in an opinion written by Judge Posner, was highly criti214. See id. at 1540 ("[Mjanagement entered into a 'no-shop' provision at the insistence of
Merrill Lynch which promised that any other offer could only be negotiated to the extent
required by fiduciary duty--obviously meaning on a pro forma basis if it meant anything.").
215. Id. at 1538-39.
216. Id. at 1543.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Fruehauf,798 F.2d at 886.
220. 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
221. Dynamic Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
222. CTSI, 794 F.2d at 251; 637 F. Supp. at 407.
223. CTS I, 794 F.2d at 258; 637 F. Supp. at 407.
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cal of the CTS board's lack of care in adopting the pill. The court emphasized that CTS's management had immediately announced its
opposition to Dynamics' bid for control on the very day of Dynamics'
announcement "without having studied... business and financial implications or even having consulted CTS's outside directors. ' 224 The court
was also concerned that CTS's retention agreement with its investment
advisor, Smith Barney, called for a bonus if Dynamics lost the proxy
fight, that Smith Barney presented its pill proposal to CTS's board "with
an accompanying 'fairness opinion' in which it opined that Dynamics'
tender offer was unfair but did not opine on whether the $43 [per share]
price in the offer was fair or unfair," and that the board adopted the pill
at the same meeting Smith Barney first presented it.225 In short, the
court concluded:
The tender offer was not evaluated in a cool, dispassionate, and
thorough fashion .... [T]he insiders on the board, in particular the
chairman, decided from the start to block the tender offer, before its
ramifications for shareholder welfare were considered; judgment first,
trial later, as the Queen of Hearts said in Alice in Wonderland. Smith
Barney held itself out as a blocker, and would have lost its $75,000
bonus if it had advised the board that the tender offer was fair and if
the end result of this advice had been226
Dynamics' wresting control of
the board from the existing directors.
"How the fairness of the tender offer could be determined without any
consideration of the fairness of the offer price," the court added, "is
227
mystifying.
Moreover, Judge Posner wrote, the CTS pill was not even "a plausible measure for maximizing shareholder wealth. ' 228 The effect of the
poison pill, assuming that all rights were exercised and a $40 per share
price, would be to reduce Dynamics' voting power in the election of the
board of directors and inflict a substantial capital loss on Dynamics. The
triggering of the poison pill would also burden CTS with a large debt-so
large, in fact, that some creditors would be entitled to call in their
loans-and thereby reduce CTS's net profits substantially. The effect
could be to imperil CTS so seriously, the court suggested, that "the
' 229
whole house of cards might collapse.
The court rejected CTS's defense of its pill "as necessary to protect
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

CTS I, 794 F.2d at 258.
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.
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minority shareholders from a disadvantageous 'back-end' transaction"
because
[i]f the rationale is to protect minority shareholders, [the pill] should
be triggered by a transaction that creates a majority shareholder or
that attempts to squeeze out the minority shareholders, and it should
give the minority the same price per share as the majority-not a
higher 230
price, calculated to kill off the tender, indeed to kill off any
tender.
CTS's pill, by contrast, was designed to be triggered much earlierat 15 percent-and to give CTS's remaining shareholders a higher price
than those who had tendered to Dynamics. 231 In short, Judge Posner
concluded, CTS's pill "effectively preclude[d] a hostile takeover, and thus
allow[ed] management to take the shareholders hostage. To buy CTS,
'2 32
you must buy out its management.
d. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. (CTS II)233 did not
involve a finding of a lack of due care. The case illustrates, however, the
kinds of process-related questions a court-in this case, the same court
that invalidated the CTS I pill-may want answered before upholding a
poison pill that puts a price tag on a company, especially when adopted
in the midst of a battle for corporate control (and after one pill has already been enjoined). Unlike CTS's first pill, the second pill was adopted
by a special committee of outside directors. This committee, working
with the company's investment advisor, recommended to the board that
the company be sold, and that a new poison pill be adopted in order to
maximize the sale price.2 34 The new pill provided that if any shareholder
obtained 28 percent of the company's common stock (Dynamics' interest
in CTS following completion of its tender offer would be 27.5 percent),
all other shareholders would receive the right to exchange each share of
their CTS stock for a $50 note payable after one year. The pill would
remain in effect for one year, but the board could redeem it at any time,
and the pill would be cancelled automatically if a $50 per share cash offer
235
was made for all shares.
The board adopted the committee's recommendation, and Dynamics filed suit once again. This time the district court refused to enjoin
CTS's pill, 236 but the Seventh Circuit, in another opinion by Judge Pos230. Id. at 259.
231. Id.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 707, 709-10.
Id. at 707; see also 635 F. Supp. at 1177 & 1179.
See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp. (CTS II), 635 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. Ill.),
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ner, vacated the district court opinion and remanded the case2 37 to
permit further consideration of three specific issues the Seventh Circuit
found unclear. First, the Seventh Circuit questioned the role of CTS's
investment adviser-Smith Barney-whose independence had been criticized in CTS I. This time Smith Barney was retained by the special committee and an uncontradicted affidavit established that its compensation
package did not include a bonus if CTS remained independent. The Seventh
Circuit,
however,
noted
a
reference
in the district court's opinion to an "incentive fee for the white knight
strategy" and the absence from the record of a new retention letter. 238
These circumstances, the court concluded, were "troubling" 239 and
"suspicious." 240
Second, the court questioned the board's decision to activate the pill
once any shareholder obtained 28 percent-rather than 50 percent-of
CTS's shares. The court noted that it was not holding that ownership of
28 percent of any corporation's stock could never "create a 'blocking
position' . . . that might justify the use of this percentage to trigger a
poison pill," but stated that evidence must justify the corporation's need
to set the triggering percentage "below the level that would give a minority shareholder an actual legal right to block decisions taken by the
24 1
majority."
Third, the court focused on the CTS board's selection of a $50 per
share valuation of the company. The court emphasized that when the
"entire premise" underlying a poison pill is "to facilitate the sale of the
company, the pill cannot be upheld if the trigger price is an unreasonably
high sale price."'242 In the case before it, the court stated, "the method
by which the $50 figure was chosen" was "troublesome. '243 The court
observed that the $50 price was derived by multiplying CTS's expected
earnings for the coming year-$3.23 per share-by a price-earnings mullaterproceedings, 638 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill.), vacated and remanded, 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir.

1986).
237. CTS II, 805 F.2d at 718.
238. Id. at 710-11. The court noted that
[t]he scheme of compensation may involve a bonus of some sort for sale to a white
knight, even if a "black knight" offers the shareholders more money for their shares.
More generally, there is no indication to what extent the amount of compensation is
linked to the price at which the company was sold-though some such link might be
necessary to align Smith Barney's self-interest with the interests of the shareholders.
Id. at 711.
239. Id. at 710.
240. Id. at 711.
241. Id. at 712-13.
242. Id. at 714.
243. Id.
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741

tiple of 15.5. The court labeled the $3.23 figure a "wildly extravagant
forecast" given the company's reduction less than a month earlier of its
1987 expected earnings from $1.50 to $0.89; the 15.5 price-earnings multiple, the court added, did not consider CTS's history of extravagant projections (a factor which would tend to depress the price-earnings multiple
when, as in CTS's case, the earnings component is a projection). 244 The
court noted that CTS's board had supplied its investment bankers with
the $3.23 per share projection, and that these bankers had accepted that
''
projection "at face value without attempting to verify it. 245
e. Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp.2 4 6 also involved a poison pill
adopted after the announcement by an unwanted suitor, Ropak Corporation, of an all-cash offer to pay $4.25 and $5.875 in cash for all common
and preferred shares, respectively, of Buckhorn stock.24 7 "[M]otivated
primarily by two objectives: 1) to stop the tender offer, although they
had not yet received an evaluation of its adequacy; and 2) to provide
some security and substantial compensation to top management at a critical point in the company's transition, '248 Buckhorn's directors quickly
approved a series of stock options and severance payments for key management employees, and modified existing option plans to ensure that all
options would vest immediately upon any change in control not approved by Buckhorn's board.24 9 Only then did the board authorize its
investment banking firm, Blunt, Ellis & Loewi (BEL), to evaluate the
adequacy of the Ropak offer. All contact with BEL was left in the hands
250
of Buckhorn's management.
Following the directors' approval at their next meeting of the creation of an ESOP, the effect of which "was to make a takeover more difficult by placing a substantial block of shares in the hands of friendly
employees and officers, '" 2 5 1 BEL advised the board that the weight of the
244. Id.
245. Id. at 714-15. The court also noted the district court's description of $50 per share as
"an outside high value based substantially on untested, optimistic management projections" in
an opinion upholding Dynamics' claim that CTS's board had made misleading representations
to CTS's shareholders during the course of the parties' proxy fight. See id. at 714 (referring to
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. XL.Rep. (CCH) 1
92,765 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 1986).
246. 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987).
247. Id. at 215.
248. Id. at 218.
249. Id. at 216-17. Several provisions of these "golden parachutes" were ultimately enjoined as breaches of the directors' fiduciary duties. See id. at 232-35, 237.
250. Id. at 218-19.
251. I'd. at 220, 223. The court concluded that the ESOP was adopted "in order to thwart
Ropak's tender offer and to entrench Buckhom's management" and enjoined the voting of
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evidence supported the conclusion that Ropak's offer was inadequate. 252
The court observed that the record before it did not indicate that the
investment bankers explained to the directors, and that the directors did
253
not ask for, the specific facts upon which BEL's opinion was based.
The court noted that Ropak's offer fell within the range of valuations
determined in three out of four analyses BEL performed and explained to
the board; in the fourth analysis, Ropak's offer was within the valuation
range for a budget plan prepared prior to Ropak's offer, which estimated
projected net income at $2.83 million, but not for a budget prepared following Ropak's offer which estimated income at $4 million. 254 Significantly, BEL declined comment on such questions as what price would be
adequate, what a range of adequate values would be, and how close
2 55
Ropak's offer was to being adequate.
Richard Johnston, Buckhorn's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, then advised the board that a potential white knight had offered $35
million for Buckhorn's "crown jewel" NesTier division. Johnston, however, valued the NesTier division at $45 million because he (1) believed,
without any formal substantiation, that the division was worth more than
$35 million, (2) assumed that all debts would be paid and that Buckhorn
would be able to sell its remaining assets at their book values, and (3)
concluded that a "break-up" of the company would yield $26.5 million.
This break-up analysis, however, did not consider deductions for the expenses of liquidation, adjustments for the time value of money, corporate
taxes, or taxation of any distribution of cash to shareholders.2 56 A second break-up analysis, based on the actual $35 million offer for NesTier,
yielded a $19 million cash pool for shareholders; the court noted that had
taxation considerations been included, that cash pool would have been
2 57
reduced to less than the amount offered by Ropak.
Buckhorn's directors then voted to reject Ropak's offer, and instructed counsel to prepare a poison pill rights plan for discussion at
their next meeting.2 58 Eleven days later, the board met by telephone for
approximately thirty minutes and adopted the pill.2 59 This pill provided
shares held by this newly created ESOP and the ESOP's acquisition of additional shares. See
id. at 231-32, 237.
252. Id. at 221.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 220-21.
256. Id. at 221-22.
257. Id. at 222.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 230.
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for the distribution of six rights per common share and ten rights per
preferred share. If anyone acquired more than 50 percent but less than
100 percent of Buckhorn's shares without the consent of Buckhorn's
board, the rights would entitle their holders to exchange their shares for
notes or a new series of preferred stock with a value of $6 per common
share and $10 per preferred share. The pill would not be triggered if the
offeror paid $6 or more per common share and $10 or more per preferred
share.260 The court found that the only information Buckhorn's directors relied upon in considering and approving the $6 and $10 price triggers was "a conclusory letter from BEL recommending the prices of $6
and $10" and an internal memorandum prepared by Carl McLaughlin,
Buckhorn's Director of Planning, which "indicate[d] that the price of
common shares should be approximately $6 per share." The court emphasized that, "there was no discussion or inquiry by the directors as to
what the bases for these prices were or as to how BEL or McLaughlin
2 61
arrived at their recommendations.
The court was "mindful that when the directors embarked upon the
task of establishing the price of Buckhorn's stock, they 'assumed a great
deal of responsibility by providing a substitute for the marketplace which
ordinarily would judge the merits of [Ropak's], and any other potential
acquiror's, tender offer.' "262 The court added that if the directors' failure to make an informed decision results in an overpriced poison pill,
then the pill becomes a "show-stopper" that prevents shareholders from
obtaining a fair market price for their stock. "Thus, it becomes critical
that the directors demonstrate that they used due care in arriving at their
2 63
decision."
Applying these legal standards, the court reasoned that, although it
was "imperative" that the directors make an informed decision concerning the value of Buckhorn stock, the evidence indicated that the directors
had failed to gather information that was reasonably available and that
cast substantial doubt on the reasonableness of the poison pill prices.
Had the directors made a reasonable inquiry into how BEL and
McLaughlin arrived at their price recommendations, they would have
discovered the following:
1) BEL had done little, if any independent analysis of the valuation
figure used as the basis for the $6 and $10 prices;
260. Id. at 223.
261. Id. at 230.
262. Id. (quoting MacAndrews & Forbes v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1247 (Del. Ch.
1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)).
263. Id. (citing CTS II, 805 F.2d at 714).
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2) BEL relied exclusively on the break-up analysis presented by
Johnston ...as the basis for computing the price of Buckhorn's stock;
3) BEL made no attempt to verify or document the assumption that
NesTier could be sold for $45 million or that any of the other assets
could be sold at prices assumed by Johnston;
4) BEL failed to incorporate into the break-up analysis costs which
the directors knew would have to be deducted from Johnston's breakup analysis, such as liquidation costs, tax effects, and the time value of
money; and
5) McLaughlin's analysis estimated the value of NesTier by using the
revised budget projection of $4 million in net profits for 1987 and multiplying this by a factor of eight. However, the 1987 revised budget
projection had never been discussed or approved by the directors and,
given Buckhorn's track record of substantially overestimating its
budget projections in prior years, is highly questionable. Moreover,
McLaughlin used a factor of eight to arrive at a value for NesTier even
though Buckhorn's investment banker considered a factor of six as
more appropriate. McLaughlin did so upon the instruction of
264
Johnston.
The court concluded that such information "[o]bviously . . . is highly
relevant to the assessment of the reasonableness of the prices set in the
poison pill," and that each of these facts could have and should have
265
been discovered upon reasonable inquiry" by Buckhorn's directors.
The court added that by failing to inquire, the directors had, like the
directors in Van Gorkom, failed to inform themselves adequately of both
their chairman's role in setting the price for the corporation's stock and
the material deficiencies in the assumptions and methods used to arrive
266
at such prices.

IV.

Post-Van Gorkom Statutes Protecting Directors from
Liability for Monetary Damages

Perhaps the most significant element of the post-Van Gorkom environment is the enactment of director-protection statutes by thirty-three
states in 1985 through 1987. Most of these statutes, typified by section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law,2 67 authorize shareholder-adopted charter provisions eliminating or limiting a director's liability to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for
conduct undertaken in good faith, but which nevertheless constitutes a
breach of the duty of care. Five additional statutes increase the standard
of directorial culpability required to find liability without the need for an
264. Id. at 230-31.
265. Id. at 231.
266. Id.
267.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
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enabling charter provision; one of these statutes also caps the amount of
268
damages for which individual directors may be held liable.
All of these statutes were prompted by a crisis that began during the

early-to-mid 1980s in the market for director and officer (D & 0) liability
insurance. Premiums skyrocketed, deductibles increased at an extraordinary rate, coverage shrank, and many insurance companies terminated
their D & 0 programs. Policy durations became shorter and shorter, the
number of exclusions in these policies increased, and nervous insurers
269
utilized early cancellation provisions to bail out of difficult situations.
Difficulties in obtaining adequate D & 0 coverage led many qualified
individuals to refuse to serve as corporate directors 270 and has threatened
27 1
a general overcautiousness in many of those who remain on boards.
One major cause-but by no means the only cause-of these developments was the Delaware Supreme Court's dramatization in Smith v.
Van Gorkom that directors could really be held personally liable for
monetary damages as a result of their conduct as directors. 272 The
doomsday predictions that greeted the Van Gorkom decision 273 fueled
the fears of directors and D & 0 carriers alike; the Second, Sixth, and
268. See infra notes 277-350 and accompanying text.
269. See D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 328-30; Balotti & Gentile,
Eliminationor Limitation of DirectorLiabilityfor Delaware Corporations,12 DEL. J. CORP. L.
5, 6 (1987); Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged
Stool of Limited Liability,Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399, 400-01 (1987);
Smith, D & 0 Liability Crisis. Good News, Bad News, 198 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1987, at 5, col. 1.
270. See Kom/Ferry International, Fourteenth Annual Boardof DirectorsStudy (Feb. 25,
1987) (noting that individuals declining invitations to serve on a board of directors for the
predominant reason of "increasing legal liability" rose from 2.5% in 1985 to 14.2% in 1986);
The Job Nobody Wants: Outside DirectorsFind That Risks and Hassles Just Aren't Worth It,
Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56; Lewin, DirectorInsurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7,
1986, at DI, col. 3 ("Just in the last six months, the Control Data Corporation, the Continental Steel Corporation, the Lear Petroleum Corporation, South Texas Drilling and Exploration
Inc. and Sykes Datatronics have all lost directors when their insurance ended.").
271. Comment to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986), reprinted in 5 R.
BALOTrI & J. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 7, at 14.1; see also Herzel, Law Should Allow Indemnity for Derivative Suits, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 31, 1986, at 11:
Directors already have a bias toward being more cautious than is optimal for society-that is, they take less risk than owner-managers would. Directors have nothing
personal to gain from risky behavior. It is, therefore, in the interest of society not to
force on directors an added incentive to be too cautious. These undesirable effects
are greatest on new, growing companies.
272. See D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 22, at 330-31; Balotti & Gentile,
supra note 269, at 7-8; King, DirectorProtection Under Virginia Law, 20 REV. SEC. & COMM.
REG. 129, 130, 132 (1987). Other factors include historically low Directors & Officers insurance premiums and low claims payments, the increased cost of defending litigation, and the
rising number of contests for corporate control. See D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN,
supra note 22, at 330-31; Balotti & Gentile, supra note 269, at 6-9.
273. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
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Seventh Circuits' granting of injunctive relief in Hanson, Fruehauf,and
CTS I, respectively, enhanced these fears. 274 Little if any attention has
been paid to the egregious facts present in these cases 27 5 or the fact that

none of these post-Van Gorkom cases found a single director liable for
monetary damages.

276

The State of Delaware undertook in June, 1986 to address this problem legislatively by adopting a new Section 102(b)(7) to its General Corporation Law. 277 This statute authorizes the adoption by shareholders of
charter provisions eliminating or limiting directorial liability for monetary damages so long as these provisions do not apply to claims for (1)
"any breach of the director's duty of loyalty," (2) "acts or omissions not
in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law," (3) unlawful payments of dividends or unlawful stock
purchases or redemptions, and (4) transactions from which the director
278
"derived an improper personal benefit."
These exclusions-the precise reach of which will almost certainly
be the subject of substantial litigation in coming months and years as
plaintiffs attempt to "recharacterize their claims and tailor them to fit
one of the excepted catagories" 279-are carefully drafted to reflect the
statute's purpose of fostering service by outside directors at a time when
many experienced candidates for such positions fear the imposition of
personal liability. First, the statute allows shareholders-the owners of
the corporation-to determine
274. See supra notes 187-232 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 142-59, 187-232 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
277. See Balotti & Gentile, supra note 269, at 9-10; Sparks, Delaware'sD & 0 Liability
Law: Other States Should Follow Suit, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 18, 1986, at 10.
278. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
279. Comment, supra note 161, at 273; see also Richards, Delaware Shareholders May
Limit DirectorsLiability Under New Law, 195 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 1986, at 35, 45 ("plaintiff's
counsel in the future will be careful to couch their complaints for monetary damages in terms
of the breach of the director's duty of loyalty, acts or omissions not in good faith and as
motivated by an attempt to achieve an improper personal benefit"). The duty of loyalty exception is a particularly likely subject for litigation since the line between the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty is not always completely clear. See Herzel, Shepro & Katz, Next-to-the-last
word on EndangeredDirectors, 65 HARV. Bus. REV. 38, 43 (1987) ("[w]ith only a little effort,
courts could find directors liable for disloyalty where before they would have found them liable
for negligence"); Franklin, D & 0 Dilemma: NY OtherStates Grapplewith Liability Issue, 197
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 1987, at 5, 6 (noting view of one practitioner that "many more cases will be
brought under the duty of loyalty theory"); Comment, supra note 161, at 273; Note, Delaware's Limit on DirectorLiability: How the Marketfor IncorporationShapes CorporateLaw, 10
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 665, 669 (1987). Commentators have also noted the possibility of
litigation regarding the statute's applicability to allegations of reckless conduct. See Veasey,
Finkelstein & Bigler, supra note 269 at 403; Note, supra, at 668-69.
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whether they wish to adopt a charter amendment pursuant to the statute and thereby enhance the likelihood of attracting and retaining
qualified outside independent directors, or whether they wish to retain
the threat of personal liability for breach of the fiduciary duty of care
as a mechanism
for policing the actions of directors, including outside
280
directors.

Second, the statute applies only to directors and not officers, since the
drafters did not believe that "the increased perception of risk of personal

liability coupled with the unavailability of D & 0 insurance were sufficient to cause officers, who depend upon a corporation for their livelihood, to resign or refuse to serve." '28 ' Third, section 102(b)(7) does not
28 2
affect the availability of equitable remedies such as injunctive relief.
Accordingly, the new section does not eliminate the directors' duty of
care.

283

As of the end of 1987, legislation modeled upon the Delaware
2 85
California, 28 6
statute has been enacted in Arizona,2 84 Arkansas,

Colorado,2 87
2 92

ana,

Georgia,2 88

Idaho, 28 9

293

Michigan,

Massachusetts,

Iowa,2 90

294

Kansas, 29 '

Minnesota,2 95

Louisi-

Montana,2 96

Nevada,2 97 New Jersey, 298 New Mexico,2 99 New York, 3°° North Carolina,30'

3 °4
Rhode Island, 30 5
Oklahoma, 30 2 Oregon, 30 3 Pennsylvania,

280.

Sparks, supra note 277, at 10.

281.

Id.

282. Comment to DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 102(b)(7), reprinted in 5 R. BALOTTI & J.
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 7, at § 14.1.
283. See Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, supra note 269, at 403 (noting that the duty of care
continues to be "vitally important in injunction and rescission cases and may well be relevant
in elections, proxy contests, resignations, and removal contexts").
284. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-054(A)(9) (Supp. 1987).
285. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-202B(3) (Supp. 1987).
286. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10) (Deering Supp. 1988).
287. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101(1)(u) (1987).
288. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-171(b)(3) (Supp. 1987).
289. See IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(2) (Supp. 1987).
290. See IOWA CODE §§ 496A.49(13), 491.5(B) (Supp. 1987).
291. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-6002(b)(8) (Supp. 1986).
292. See Act of July 3, 1987, Act 261, §§ 1, 3, 1987 La. Sess. Law Serv. 131-32 (West
1987) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(C)(4)).
293. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1-1/2) (West Supp. 1987).
294. See Act of Feb. 27, 1987, Pub. Act No. 1, § 209, 1987 Mich. Legis. Serv. 1-2 (West)
(to be codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1209(4)).
295. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(4) (West Supp. 1987).
296. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-202(2)(a)(v) (1987).
297. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.036(1) (Michie 1987).
298. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:2-7(3) (West Supp. 1987).
299. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2(E) (1987).
300. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
301. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11) (Michie Supp. 1987).
302. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1006(B)(7) (Supp. 1988).
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Washington, 30 9 and Wyoming. 310
The Louisiana, Nevada, and New Jersey statutes differ from the Delaware model by providing protection for corporate officers as well as directors.3t The Nevada statute also differs from the Delaware statute by
not specifically including breach of duty of loyalty or receipt of an "improper personal benefit" as exceptions to the authorization of charter
provisions eliminating or limiting director liability. 31 2 In addition, and
unlike any other section 102(b)(7)-type statute, the Nevada statute lists
31 3
"fraud" as an exception to its authorization of exculpatory provisions.
South Dakota, 30

6

Texas, 30 7 Utah, 30

8

The Georgia statute, like the Nevada statute, does not specifically
bar charter provisions protecting directors from liability for breaches of
the duty of loyalty, but in place of this exception includes a prohibition
upon provisions eliminating or limiting liability for "any appropriation,
in violation of [a director's] duties, of any business opportunity of the
corporation. ' 31 4 The drafters of this provision noted that the Delaware
"duty of loyalty" exception "was believed to be an inadequately defined
concept," and that Georgia's combination of its "corporate opportunity"
exception with the "improper personal benefit" exception taken unchanged from Delaware's statute "reflect[ed] the general principle that a
director's liability should not be limited with respect to self-dealing and
similar situations in which the director's interests conflict with those of
' 31 5
the corporation.
The Arkansas statute, while otherwise identical to the Delaware
statute, provides that liability may not be eliminated or limited for acts
"creating third party liability to any person or entity other than the corporation or stockholder. ' 31 6 The North Carolina statute, by contrast,
303. See OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(c) (1987).
304. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
305. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48(a)(6) (Supp. 1987).
306. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-58.8 (Supp. 1987).
307. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1302-7.06(B) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
308. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1 (Supp. 1987).
309. See Act of April 29, 1987, ch. 212, § 701, 1987 Wash. Legis. Serv. 341, 343 (West) (to
be codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.12.020(d)).
310. See Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-202(C) (1987).
311. See Act of July 3, 1987, Act 261 §§ 1, 3, 1987 La. Sess. Law Serv. 131-32 (West 1987)
(to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.24(C)(4); NEV. REV.STAT. ANN. § 78.036(1)
(Michie 1987); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:2-7(3), 14A:6-14(4) (West Supp. 1987).
312. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.036(1)(a) (Michie 1987).
313. Id.
314. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-171(b)(3)(i) (Supp. 1987)
315. Note to 1987 Amendment, printed in GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-171(b)(3) (Supp. 1987).
316. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-202B(3)(v) (Supp. 1987); see also Comment, supra note 161,
at 276 (noting that third parties, such as bondholders, insurance policy holders, creditors, and
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specifies that it permits the limitation or elimination of liability arising
out of actions "whether by or in the right of the corporation or otherwise."' 3 17 North Carolina's statute omits the breach of the duty of loyalty
exception found in the Delaware statute, and specifies that "the term 'improper personal benefit' does not include a director's compensation or
other incidental benefit for or on account of his service as a director,
officer, employee, independent contractor, attorney, or consultant of the
corporation. ' 3 18 Montana's statute differs from the Delaware model by
replacing Delaware's exclusion for "intentional misconduct" with an exclusion for "willful misconduct" and "recklessness. ' 319 New Jersey's
statute does not include either "intentional misconduct" or unlawful dividends, stock purchases, and redemptions as exceptions. 32 0 The Texas
statute expands upon Delaware's "improper benefit" exception by specifying that the exception applies "whether or not the benefit resulted from
an action taken within the scope of the director's office." '32 1 The Texas
statute also includes an exception for acts for which liability "is expressly
provided for by statute. ' 322 Utah's statute, which is otherwise similar to
the Delaware model, permits adoption of provisions eliminating or limiting personal liability in a corporation's bylaws or by resolution, so long
as the provision is approved by the same percentage of shareholders as is
required to approve a charter amendment. 323 Utah's statute also purports to apply to foreign corporations authorized to transact business in
Utah. 324 Washington's statute omits the Delaware model's breach of the
duty of loyalty and conduct not in good faith exceptions, and, in place of
the improper personal benefit exception, includes an exception for "any
transaction from which the director will personally receive a benefit in
money, property, or services to which the director is not legally
32 5
entitled."
The California, New York, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania statutes
contain more substantive differences from the Delaware model. California's statute (which, like those in Georgia, Nevada, and Washington,
parties to other contracts, "have no say in the adoption or maintenance" of liability limiting
provisions).
317. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11) (Michie Supp. 1987).
318. Id.
319.

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-202(2)(a)(v)(B) (1987).
N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:A-7(3) (West Supp. 1987).

TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-7.06(B)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
Id. art. 1302-7.06(B)(4).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1(3) (Supp. 1987).
Id. § 16-10-49.1(4).
Act of April 29, 1987, ch. 212, § 701, 1987 Wash. Legis. Serv. 341, 343 (West) (to be

codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.12.020(d)).
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does not specifically include breach of the duty of loyalty as an exception 326) lists several exceptions not included in the Delaware statute.
Among these exceptions are (1) acts "a director believes to be contrary to
the best interests of the corporation or its shareholders," (2) acts that
"show a reckless disregard for the director's duty to the corporation or
its shareholders in circumstances in which the director was aware, or
should have been aware, in the ordinary course of performing a director's
duties, of a risk of serious injury to the corporation or its shareholders,"
and (3) acts constituting "an unexcused pattern of inattention that
amounts to an abdication of the director's duty to the corporation or its
shareholders. '327 The California statute, in a manner similar to the Arkansas statute, 328 also specifically limits the reach of charter provisions
eliminating or limiting liability to actions "brought by or in the right of
the corporation for breach of a director's duties to the corporation and its
shareholders," as set forth in the specific section of the California Gen329
eral Corporation Law governing the duties of a director.
New York's statute authorizes the adoption of charter provisions
eliminating or limiting a director's liability provided that no such provision eliminates or limits "the liability of any director if a judgment or
other final adjudication adverse to him establishes that his acts or omissions were in bad faith or involved intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law or that he personally gained in fact a financial profit or
other advantage to which he was not legally entitled" 330 or that his acts
"violated" a specific provision of New York's statute barring unlawful
dividends, share repurchases, post-dissolution asset distributions and unlawful loans to directors. 33 1 The New Mexico and Pennsylvania statutes
authorize provisions that would eliminate (no reference is made to simply limiting) a director's liability unless his breach of the standard of
directorial conduct constitutes, in New Mexico, "negligence, willful misconduct or recklessness, '332 and in Pennsylvania, "self-dealing, willful
misconduct or recklessness. ' 333 Pennsylvania's statute also provides exceptions for criminal conduct and failure to pay taxes, and requires a
326.
327.

See supra notes 312, 314, 325 and accompanying text.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10)(A) (Deering Supp. 1988).

328.
329.

See supra note 316.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10)(A) (Deering Supp. 1988) (citing CAL. CORP. CODE

§ 309).
330.
331.
332.
333.

N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
Id. (citing N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 719).
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2(E).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364 (Purdon Supp. 1987).

March 1988]

DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CARE

bylaw rather than a charter provision. 334
33 6 Ohio,337 Virginia, 338
Five additional states-Florida, 335 Indiana,
and Wisconsin 339-have responded to both the D & 0 crisis and the need
for corporations to continue attracting qualified outside directors with
statutes that increase the standard of director culpability required to find
liability. A corporation need not adopt a charter provision or seek shareholder approval (or both) in order to benefit from these statutes. Rather,
the legislatures in these states have determined, as a matter of public
policy, that directors of all corporations incorporated under the laws of
those states should be shielded from monetary liability to the extent set
forth in these statutes.
Florida's statute, for example, provides that a director is not liable
for monetary damages for any breach of his duties as a director unless
the breach constitutes (1) a violation of criminal law, except when the
director "had reasonable cause to believe his conduct was lawful or had
no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful," (2) "a transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit, either
directly or indirectly," (3) unlawful payments of dividends or unlawful
stock purchases or unlawful sales of assets, (4) in a derivative action,
"conscious disregard for the best interest of the corporation, or willful
misconduct," or (5) in a non-derivative action, "recklessness or an act or
omission which was committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or
in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights,
' '34
safety, or property. 0
Indiana's statute provides that a director is not liable for monetary
damages for failure to act in compliance with his duties as a director
'34 1
unless the conduct constitutes "willful misconduct or recklessness."
Virginia's statute precludes director liability for conduct "in accordance
with [the director's] good faith business judgment of the best interests of
'342
the corporation.
The Ohio and Wisconsin statutes similarly limit director liability,
334. Id.
335. See Act of June 30, 1987, ch. 87-245, 7, 1987 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 341-43 (West) (to
be codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1645).
336. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 1987).
337. See OHIo REV. CODE. ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
338. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-690A, C (1985).
339. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.307(1) (West Supp. 1987).
340. Act of June 30, 1987, ch. 87-245, 7, 1987 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 341-43 (West) (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 607.1645(1)).
341. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 1987).
342. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 A,C (1985).
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but authorize the corporation to "opt out" of this standard by charter
provision (as opposed to the Delaware model, which allows corporations
to "opt in"). Ohio's statute limits a director's liability for monetary damages unless it is proven, "by clear and convincing evidence," that the act
or omission was "undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the
corporation or undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests
of the corporation. ' 343 Wisconsin's statute provides directors with immunity from personal liability unless the person asserting such liability
proves (1) "a wilful failure to deal fairly with the corporation or its shareholders in connection with a matter in which the director has a material
conflict of interest," (2) a violation of criminal law, except when the director had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful, (3)
"a transaction from which the director had derived an improper personal
profit," or (4) wilful misconduct.

3 44

Finally, Virginia, in addition to precluding liability for conduct "in
accordance with [the director's] good faith business judgment of the best
interests of the corporation,

' 345

has also adopted legislation that places a

ceiling-with or without shareholder approval-upon the amount of
damages that can be recovered from officers and directors in actions by
shareholders (but not in actions by the corporation) "arising out of a
single transaction, occurrence or course of conduct. '346 The ceiling is
equal to the greater of $100,000 or the amount of cash compensation
received by an officer or director within the twelve months preceding the
challenged conduct, 347 and is inapplicable in cases involving willful misconduct or a knowing violation of law. 348 The corporation may specify a

lower ceiling in its articles of incorporation, or, if approved by shareholders, in its bylaws. 349 Some Virginia corporations have reportedly proposed either complete eliminations of liability for monetary damages or
0
caps of $1.35

The most recently published draft of the American Law Institute's
(ALI) corporate governance project-Principlesof Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations-also proposes adoption of a ceiling on the amount of damages that can be recovered against directors
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
Second

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.307(1) (West Supp. 1987).
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 A,C (1985); see supra note 342 and accompanying text.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1A (Supp. 1987).
Id.
Id. § 13.1-692.1B.
Id. § 13.1-692.1A: see also King, supra note 272, at 132-33.
See Hanks, DirectorLiability, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1988, at 20; Kennedy, New York Enacts
Statute; CaliforniaProposal Pending, 8 Bus. LAW. UPDATE 1, 2 (Sept.-Oct. 1987).
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and officers for duty of care violations that do not (1) "involve a knowing
and culpable violation of law," (2) enable the director or officer (or associates) to receive an "improper" benefit, (3) "show a conscious disregard
for the duty of the director or officer to the corporation under circumstances in which the director or officer was aware that his conduct or
omission created an unjustified risk of serious injury to the corporation,"
or (4) "constitute a sustained and unexcused pattern of inattention that
amounted to an abdication of the defendant's duty to the corporation. ' 35 1 The ALI ceiling, according to this draft, would be equal not to
a specified amount, but rather to "an amount that is not disproportionate
to the compensation received by the director or officer for serving the
corporation during the year of the violation. ' 352 Unlike Virginia's statute, the ALI's draft does not preclude liability for conduct "in accordance with [the director's] good faith business judgment of the best
interests of the corporation," and the ALI's proposed ceiling may not be
reduced by the corporation's shareholders. Such a ceiling, it should be
noted, poses the risk that judges and juries may be more inclined to find
directorial liability because such liability would be "limited" rather than
potentially overwhelming, and has thus been criticized by many in both
35 3
the business and legal communities.
These statutory provisions (other than the ALI proposal) are intended to-and do-greatly decrease the possibility of a finding of direc354
torial liability for monetary damages for a duty of care violation.
Indeed, the Van Gorkom court's finding that the Trans Union directors'
conduct, while grossly negligent, nevertheless constituted good faith con351. See Principlesof CorporateGovernance: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.17 (Tent.
Draft No.7, 1987).
352. Id.
353. See, eg., American Bar Association Section of Litigation'sConsolidatedComments to
the American Law Institute's Project on "Principlesof Corporate Governance: Analysis and

Recommendations" 274-80 (Aug. 1, 1984); Statement of The BusinessRoundtable on the American Law Institute's Proposed"Principlesof Corporate Governanceand Structure: Restatement
andRecommendations" 64-66 (Feb. 1983); Kennedy, The Standardof Responsibilityfor Directors, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 624, 642 (1984); Steinberg, The American Law Institute'sDraft
Restatement on Corporate Governance: The Business Judgment Rule, Related Principles,and
Some General Observations, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 295, 304-05 (1983); Subak, A Snapshot of
the Law Being Carved in Stone, 42 Bus. LAW. 761, 768-69 (1987). The author notes that his
firm, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, is counsel to The Business Roundtable's Corporate Responsibility Task Force in connection with the ALI project.
354. A November 1986 survey by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries reveals
that 212 of the Society's members had determined to submit proposals under § 102(b)(7) of
the Delaware Corporation Law to their shareholders within six months of the statute's adoption. See Pease, Outside Directors: Their Importance to the Corporation and Protectionfrom
Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 25, 95 (1987).
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duct 355 presumably would have absolved the directors of liability for
monetary damages under section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware statute had
Trans Union's shareholders adopted a charter provision eliminating such
liability.
Conclusion
The case law and statutory developments during the three years following the Delaware Supreme Court's landmark decision in Smith v. Van
Gorkom demonstrate that the business judgment rule's presumption that
356
directorial decisions are made in good faith and are informed decisions
remains alive and well. Assuming the facts in Van Gorkom to be as they
were set forth in that court's majority opinion, 357 the Trans Union directors' conduct-the sale of their shareholders' company for $700 million
solely on the basis of a two-hour meeting without any prior agenda notice
and without any particularized study regarding value-was an egregiously inadequate exercise of the directors' responsibilities to Trans
Union's shareholders, and certainly not typical of the manner in which
358
most boards conduct business.
Since Van Gorkom was decided, the courts have repeatedly rejected
due care allegations in cases in which the challenged board conduct did
359
not approach the level of gross negligence present in Van Gorkom.
The six courts that have found violations of the duty of care since Van
Gorkom-Frantz,Sealy, Hanson, Fruehauf CTS I, and Buckhorn-were
faced with conduct similar to or at least approaching that found by the
Van Gorkom court. Frantz involved patently inequitable and entrenchment motivated conduct seeking to undo a takeover bid after control had
already passed to another group, and Sealy involved conduct that even
the directors' counsel conceded was uninformed.3 60 Hanson, Fruehauf
CTS I, and Buckhorn each involved board efforts to preempt the market
place. The challenged conduct in Hanson and Fruehaufcut off on-going
and competitive bidding processes in favor of preferred bidders aligned
with management. The challenged conduct in CTS I and Buckhorn put
into place poison pills designed to end unwanted takeover bids. In all
four of these cases, this defensive conduct was undertaken without studying the terms of the transaction, without asking what these courts viewed
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
See supra notes 31-34, 42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85-86, 90-130 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 142-56, 168-86 and accompanying text.
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as simple and obviously relevant questions and without using time the
courts believed was available to the directors. 36 1 These cases certainly do
not reflect a change in the courts' traditional adherence to the business
judgment rule's presumption that directorial conduct is the product of
good faith and an informed decision-making process.
Moreover, each of the post-Van Gorkom findings of a lack of due
care have come in the context of requests for injunctive relief rather than
in settings when courts faced the prospect of imposing monetary damages upon individual directors. Accordingly, even if the courts were
more inclined following Van Gorkom to find lapses in directorial decision-making, it is not at all clear that the courts would be inclined to do
so in actions where monetary damages were at stake. 362 And, even if the
courts were inclined to find such liability, statutes enacted since Van
Gorkom in Delaware and thirty-two other states ensure that directors
may be protected by the corporation's stockholders from the risk of personal liability for conduct undertaken in good faith. This protection may
come in the form of the adoption of a charter provision authorized by a
statute such as Delaware's section 102(b)(7) or the incorporation (or
reincorporation) in a jurisdiction that has heightened the directorial stan36 3
dard of culpability required to find liability.
Perhaps the most enduring effect of Van Gorkom is its reminder to
directors of the business judgment rule's limits and the importance of
board compliance with the process that should be followed when considering fundamental issues affecting the corporation's continued existence
as an independent entity. Boards that understand and follow the teachings of Van Gorkom and its progeny will find themselves on strong legal
364
grounds.
361. See supra notes 157-59, 187-266 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 267-350 and accompanying text.
364. See Block & Hoff, supra note 84, at 5; Hansen, The ALl Corporate Governance Project: of the Duty ofDue Care and the Business Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 Bus. LAW.
1237, 1249 n.57 (1986) (noting that the directors in Van Gorkom "were held liable, not because
they failed to inform themselves to the extent they 'reasonably believed to be appropriate under
the circumstances'.., but rather because they had not.., taken appropriate steps to inform

themselves"); Manning, supra note 5, at 4 (Van Gorkom "can be fitted... into the mainstream
of business judgment rule jurisprudence, with its emphasis not on the merits of the decision
made by the directors but on the process by which the decision was made") (emphasis in
original).
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Appendix
State-by-State Compilation of Post-Van Gorkom Due Care Decisions (By
Governing Law and in Alphabetical Order)
Delaware
Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio) (finding
lack of due care), aff'd mem., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987); EAC Industries, Inc. v. Frantz Manufacturing Co., 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 608 (Del.
Ch.) (finding lack of due care), aff'd on other grounds, 501 A.2d 401
(1985); Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 835
(Del. Ch. 1985) (finding due care); Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee
Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93, 544 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1,
1987) (finding due care); Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914 (Del. Ch. 1987)
(granting motion to dismiss allegations of a lack of due care), appeal argued, No. 133, 1987 (Del. Nov. 3, 1987); Lewis v. Honeywell Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93, 566 (Del. Ch. July 28, 1987)
(granting motion to dismiss allegations of a lack of due care); Lewis v.
Leaseway Transportation Corp., No. 8720, slip op. (Del. Ch. June 12,
1987) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file) (finding due care); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Unocal Corp., No. 7997, slip op. (Del. Ch. May 13, 1985)
(LEXIS, States library, Del. file) (finding due care), rev'd on other
grounds, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household International,
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (finding due care); Rabkin v. Philip A.
Hunt Chemical Corp., No. 7547, slip op. (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1986)
(LEXIS, States library, Del. file) (denying motion to dismiss all but one
of a series of claims alleging a lack of due care); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil
Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985) (finding due care), motion for reargument
denied, No. 7547, slip op. (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file); Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 663 F.
Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding due care); Schlossberg v. First Artists Production Co., No. 6670, slip op. (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1986) (LEXIS,
States library, Del. file) (finding due care); Sealy Mattress Co. of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Sealy, Inc., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
93,331 (Del. Ch. July 20, 1987) (finding lack of due care);
Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc. (Morton Thiokol I), 10 Del. J. Corp.
L. 921 (Del. Ch. 1985) (finding due care); Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol,
Inc. (Morton Thiokol II), No. 7861, slip op. (Del. Ch. May 7, 1986)
(LEXIS, States library, Del. file) (denying motion to dismiss allegations
of a lack of due care).
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Indiana
Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. (CTS I), 794 F.2d 250 (7th
Cir. 1986) (finding lack of due care), aff'g 637 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ill.)
(finding lack of due care), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987);
Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. (CTS II), 805 F.2d 705 (7th
Cir. 1986) (remanding due care issue), vacating and remanding, 638 F.
Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill.) (finding due care).
Michigan
Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding lack of
due care), aff'g Plaza Securities Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp.
1535 (E.D. Mich.) (finding lack of due care).
Missouri
Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 642 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (finding due care).
New York
British Printing & Communication Corp. plc v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding due care); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986)
(finding lack of due care), rev'g Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 623 F.
Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding due care).
Pennsylvania
Keyser v. Commonwealth National Financial Corp. (Commonwealth
National I), 644 F. Supp. 1130 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (finding due care);
Keyser v. Commonwealth National Financial Corp. (Commonwealth
National II), No. 85-1853, slip op. (M.D. Pa. June 30, 1987) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist. file) (denying motion for summary judgment due to
issues of fact regarding due care).

